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Political Game Theory
Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.
Political Game Theory
Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design, and a mathematical appendix covering logic, real analysis, calculus, and probability theory. (A cura dell'editore).
Career Concerns and the Dynamics of Electoral Accountability
Quantifying the value that legislators give to reelection relative to policy is crucial to understanding electoral accountability. We estimate the preferences for office and policy of members of the US Senate, using a structural approach that exploits variation in polls, position-taking and advertising throughout the electoral cycle. We then combine these preference estimates with estimates of the electoral effectiveness of policy moderation and political advertising to quantify electoral accountability in competitive and uncompetitive elections. We find that senators differ markedly in the value they give to securing office relative to policy gains: while over a fourth of senators are highly ideological, a sizable number of senators are willing to make relatively large policy concessions to attain electoral gains. Nevertheless, electoral accountability is only moderate on average, due to the relatively low impact of changes in senators' policy stance on voter support.
Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints
We consider accountability in repeated elections with two long-lived parties that have distinct policy preferences and different levels of valence. In each period the government faces a privately observed feasibility constraint and selects a publicly observed policy vector. While pure strategy equilibria do not exhibit tight control on government policy making, complete control is possible in mixed strategies. In optimal equilibria voters use reelection functions which depend on policy in a manner that causes the governing party to internalize voter preferences. In these optimal equilibria the voters use different reelection functions for different parties.
Public Information as a Source of Disagreement Among Shareholders
We study how beliefs about firm value respond to public information stemming from either public announcements or shareholder meetings. We focus on settings with homogeneous shareholders (i.e., agents with common preferences and opinions), where information is about which course of action is best for the firm. The analysis illustrates that extant work dismissing homogeneous shareholders models has over-reached. Counter to the received wisdom, these models can explain increases in trading volume after public events (a pattern which is documented by several empirical papers). Two economic insights surface. First, when homogeneous shareholders anticipate that firm decisions will be guided by information, the presence of differences in belief about the firm's fundamentals and best course of action need not lead to differences in belief about firm value. Second, when voting is not fully informative, homogeneous shareholders will seek to generate informational rents from trading after the vote. Both of these incentive effects will tend to generate increases in trading volume after public events.
The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy
Examines the interplay between the normative and empirical aspects of the deliberative model of democracy.
Parties in Elections, Parties in Government, and Partisan Bias
Political parties are active when citizens choose among candidates in elections, and when winning candidates choose among policy alternatives in government. But the inextricably linked institutions, incentives, and behavior that determine these multistage choices are substantively complex and analytically unwieldy, particularly if modeled explicitly and considered in total: from citizen preferences through government outcomes. To strike a balance between complexity and tractability, we modify standard spatial models of electoral competition and governmental policy-making and develop a model to study how components of partisanship - such as candidate platform separation in elections, party-ID-based voting, national partisan tides, and party-disciplined behavior in the legislature - are related to outcomes that deviate systematically from a citizen-based central benchmark. Such deviation is called partisan bias. The study reveals that none of the party-in-electorate conditions is capable of producing biased policy outcomes independently. Specified combinations of conditions, however, can significantly increase the bias and/or the variance of policy outcomes, sometimes in subtle ways.
Run Boris Run
Following the 1995 Russian parliamentary election, it was suggested that Russian voters may have used their votes to send a message to the then current Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, who was scheduled to run for reelection six months later. Building on this observation, we consider the incentives for information transmission through strategic voting in systems with sequential elections. We find that when an election for a sufficiently weak institution (e.g., a parliament) precedes an election for a strong institution (e.g., a president), in any equilibrium some voters vote against their preferred party in the first election to send a message to candidates in the second election. Following a brief discussion of the intuition underlying this argument, we present a model that allows us to isolate institutional features that affect the prevalence of this type of strategic voting: the relative importance of institutions to voters, the timing of sequential elections, and the relative cost of responsiveness by candidates.
