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Examines the practice of air interdiction in three wars: World War II, the Korean War, & the war in Southeast Asia. The author proposes a realistic objective for interdiction: preventing men, equipment, & supplies from reaching the combat area when the enemy needs them & in the amount he requires. Bibliography & index. Contains over 100 charts, tables, maps, & photos.
Three distinguished USAF Generals offer their wisdom on Aerial Interdiction. In the long evolution of American air power in the twentieth century the professional experiences and judgments of these senior air leaders are both representative and instructive. Over one hundred years of military service are contained in this oral history interview, almost all of it concerned with the application of a new kind of military force—air power—to the oldest of military questions: how to defeat enemy armies. In discussing their experiences in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, these men focus on those air campaigns which have come to be considered classics of air interdiction: in World War II, Operat...
Published by Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9328 for the Pacific Air Forces Office of History, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
This analytical work by Dr. Eduard Mark of the Center for Air Force History examines the practice of air interdiction in three wars: World War II, the Korean War, and the war in Southeast Asia. It considers eleven important interdiction campaigns, all of them American or Anglo-American, for only the United States and Great Britain had the resources to conduct interdiction campaigns on a large scale in World War II. Dr. Mark proposes what he considers to be a realistic objective for interdiction: preventing men, equipment, and supplies from reaching the combat area when the enemy needs them and in the quantity he requires. As Mark notes, there has been little intensive scholarship on the subj...
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This study attempts to show the misapplication of tactical airpower by the Luftwaffe in support of German ground forces during the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. The analysis is based on an investigation of historical references and provides lessons learned which might be applied in future conflicts. The study shows that the Luftwaffe concentrated its efforts at Kursk on Close Air Support and neglected Battlefield Air Interdiction. This was primarily because Close Air Support had proven itself so successful in German experience prior to Kursk. However, the failure of the Luftwaffe to interdict Russian reinforcements at Kursk proved to be critical and contributed to the German defeat. Air planners must realize that a correct balance between Close Air Support and Battlefield Air Interdiction is essential to the efficient use of airpower during any tactical application in support of ground forces. Neither Close Air Support nor Battlefield Air Interdiction should gain primacy in doctrine, rather, a mix of the two should be applied on a situational basis.
The brief note argues that battle relevance rather than battlefield proximity is the useful criterion in distinguishing between tactical and strategic air interdiction. Tactical interdiction (as defined here) has to do with target systems having payoffs directly and immediately related to the success of friendly ground forces, whereas strategic interdiction has to do with target systems having payoffs that are only indirectly and in the long term related to ground force success. 'Tactical' is related to a particular battle; 'strategic' to a campaign or even the war as a whole. This distinction is contrasted with the close-versus-deep dichotomy now favored by some analysts. (Author).