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The Shared World
A novel treatment of the capacity for shared attention, joint action, and perceptual common knowledge. In The Shared World, Axel Seemann offers a new treatment of the capacity to perceive, act on, and know about the world together with others. Seemann argues that creatures capable of joint attention stand in a unique perceptual and epistemic relation to their surroundings; they operate in an environment that they, through their communication with their fellow perceivers, help constitute. Seemann shows that this relation can be marshaled to address a range of questions about the social aspect of the mind and its perceptual and cognitive capacities. Seemann begins with a conceptual question about a complex kind of sociocognitive phenomenon—perceptual common knowledge—and develops an empirically informed account of the spatial structure of the environment in and about which such knowledge is possible. In the course of his argument, he addresses such topics as demonstrative reference in communication, common knowledge about jointly perceived objects, and spatial awareness in joint perception and action.
Joint Attention
Interdisciplinary perspectives on definitional concerns, underlying mechanisms, and the functional significance of joint attention. Academic interest in the phenomenon of joint attention—the capacity to attend to an object together with another creature—has increased rapidly over the past two decades. Yet it isn't easy to spell out in detail what joint attention is, how it ought to be characterized, and what exactly its significance consists in. The writers for this volume address these and related questions by drawing on a variety of disciplines, including developmental and comparative psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. The volume organizes their contributions alon...
The Shared World
A novel treatment of the capacity for shared attention, joint action, and perceptual common knowledge. In The Shared World, Axel Seemann offers a new treatment of the capacity to perceive, act on, and know about the world together with others. Seemann argues that creatures capable of joint attention stand in a unique perceptual and epistemic relation to their surroundings; they operate in an environment that they, through their communication with their fellow perceivers, help constitute. Seemann shows that this relation can be marshaled to address a range of questions about the social aspect of the mind and its perceptual and cognitive capacities. Seemann begins with a conceptual question about a complex kind of sociocognitive phenomenon—perceptual common knowledge—and develops an empirically informed account of the spatial structure of the environment in and about which such knowledge is possible. In the course of his argument, he addresses such topics as demonstrative reference in communication, common knowledge about jointly perceived objects, and spatial awareness in joint perception and action.
Voices from the Edge
Over the past several decades, scholars working in biblical, theological, and religious studies have increasingly attended to the substantive ways that our experiences and understanding of God and God's relation to the world are structured by our experiences and concepts of race, gender, disability, and sexuality. These personal and social identities and their intersections serve as a hermeneutical lens for our interpretations of God, self, the other, and our religious texts and traditions. However, they have not received nearly the same level of attention from analytic theologians and philosophers of religion, and so a wide range of important issues remain ripe for analytic treatment. The p...
The Politics of Attention and the Promise of Mindfulness
It is evident from recent political campaigns, such as that of Donald Trump, that the deployment of attention is crucial for political outcomes. Indeed, Trump’s presidency came about in part due to realities that were produced by the media themselves, which required in turn the engagement of public attention. The implication is that the instability and capriciousness that is often associated with attention can be an important influence on the outcomes that are so produced. Drawing on the thought of Martin Heidegger, Lawrence Berger puts forward a new conception of attention as human presence, showing how its state determines the efficacy of public spaces in articulating and achieving visio...
Paul and the Person
In this book Susan Grove Eastman presents a fresh and innovative exploration of Paul’s participatory theology in conversation with both ancient and contemporary conceptions of the self. Juxtaposing Paul, ancient philosophers, and modern theorists of the person, Eastman opens up a conversation that illuminates Paul’s thought in new ways and brings his voice into current debates about personhood.
A Phenomenology of Attention and the Unfamiliar
Building on the thriving discussion on the role of attention within the phenomenological tradition, from Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty to Bernhard Waldenfels, this book investigates the enigmatic role of attention as a faculty that enables change within subjective and intersubjective experience. The aim of the book is to reveal some characteristics of the processes in which subjects are unmade and remade, and to highlight how we are able to change our relation to an empirical world that nevertheless has unity and constancy in our perception.
Why Suicide Is Amoral
Moral evaluations of actions are only appropriate for actions within the moral domain. Actions outside of the moral domain are amoral actions. In Why Suicide Is Amoral: A Philosophical Account, Robyn Gaier emphasizes the role of agency in determining whether an action is within the moral domain. If an agent lacks either deliberative agency or moral agency, then their action is amoral. An agent lacks deliberative agency if they cannot evaluate and act upon reasons, and moral agency if they cannot act upon moral reasons. Actions in which such agencies are compromised are also amoral actions. In treating actions of suicide, while granting their diversity, this book traces them to the loss or threat of loss of basic psychological needs. Gaier argues that when basic psychological needs are lost or under threat, an agent’s deliberative agency, moral agency, or both are either lacking or compromised. Hence, actions of suicide are amoral, and it is a conceptual mistake to attempt the moral evaluation of actions of suicide. Furthermore, when we regard actions of suicide as within the moral domain, we perpetuate a social stigma against suicide.
Self-Evaluation
The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. As the focus of the volume is truly innovative we expect the book to sell well to both philosophers and scholars from neighboring fields such as social and cognitive science. The predominant view in analytic philosophy is that an ability for self-evaluation is constitutive for agency and intentionality. Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: Firstly, self-evaluation is usually discussed in individual terms, and, as such, not sufficiently related to its social dimensions; secondly, self-evaluation is viewed as a matter of belief and desire, neglecting its affective and emotional aspects. The aim of the book is to fill these research lacunas and to investigate the question of how these two shortcomings of the received views are related.
Rethinking the Relationship Between International, EU and National Law
The interdisciplinary embedding and novel conceptual approach offered in the book to address the relationship between legal orders offers a significant and original contribution to the literature. The first part of the book provides a critical account of dominant approaches to explain this relationship where theories of Kelsenian monism, dualism, legal pluralism and constitutionalism are criticized. In the second part, Kirchmair engages with an innovative idea by applying insights from social contract theory to the relationship between international, EU and Member State law and establishes his theoretical approach: Consent-Based Monism. The book focuses on the most important structural characteristics of the external relations law of the EU as well as the primacy of EU law in lieu of national constitutional identity which is demonstrated in part three.
