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'Knowledge-First' constitutes what is widely regarded as one of the most significant innovations in contemporary epistemology in the past 25 years. Knowledge-first epistemology is the idea that knowledge per se should not be analysed in terms of its constituent parts (e.g., justification, belief), but rather that these and other notions should be analysed in terms of the concept of knowledge. This volume features a substantive introduction and 13 original essaysfrom leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of knowledge-first philosophy. The contributors' essays range from foundational issues to applications of this project to other disciplinesincluding the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of perception, ethics and action theory. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind aims to provide a relatively open-ended forum for creative and original scholarship with the potential to contribute and advance debates connected with this philosophical project.
Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
'The Rules of Thought' develops a rationalist theory of mental content while defending a traditional epistemology of philosophy. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis contend that a capacity for pure rational thought is fundamental to mental content itself and underwrites our quotidian reasoning and extraordinary philosophical engagement alike.
What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experienc...
Charles Travis investigates a central problem in philosophy, one of the most puzzling. Thought must be about a world independent of us. But our capacities for thought shape thought's objects. So it can seem that what is true, and what is not, cannot be independent of us. Objectivity and the Parochial suggests how we might resolve this paradox.
This book collects some of McDowell’s most influential papers of the last two decades. The essays deal with themes such as the interpretation of Aristotle’s and Plato’s ethical writings, questions in moral philosophy that arise out of the Greek tradition, Wittengensteinian ideas about reason in action, and issues central to philosophy of mind.
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a periodical publication which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe, and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: - traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of scepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc; - new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and app...
This accessible Element defends version of virtue epistemology shown to have all-things-considered advantages over other views on the market. The view is unorthodox, in that it incorporates Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction, which has thus far had few takers. The author shows why embracing a multi-tiered framework is not a liability within virtue epistemology but instead affords it an edge not attainable otherwise. The particular account of knowledge goes beyond Sosa's own view by introducing and incorporating several theoretical innovations (regarding both basing and risk, as well as the introduction of multiple species of reflective knowledge) which are aimed at revamping how we think about 'high-grade' knowledge, how we attain it, and what it demands of us. The result is a new and improved stratified virtue epistemology that can hold up against scrutiny.
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Thomson provides a systematic theory of human and social rights, elucidating what in general makes an attribution of a right true. This is a major effort to provide a stable foundation for the deeply held belief that we are not mere cogs in a communal machine, but are instead individuals whose private interests are entitled to respect.