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In this timely work, Bernard C. Beaudreau provides a new approach to world trade, one that combines the archaeological and historical record with recent developments in the theory of networks, the result of which is a convincing account of trading patterns, past, present, and undoubtedly, into the future. For the first time, trade theory is no longer at odds with the historical record. Likewise, for the first time, trade policy is no longer at odds with the historical record.In short, this book is the first work of its kind to attempt to integrate over 8,000 years of large-scale international trade.
Economists and historians view the events of the 1920s, the stock market boom and crash, the Great Depression and the New Deal, as being largely independent. This work presents an integrated, empirically-consistent view of this important period arguing that all of these events can be traced back to a paradigm technology shock, namely the electrification of U.S. industry from 1910 to 1926. The author goes from electrification through the stock market boom to the tariffs of the late 20s to the stock market crash and depression followed by the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933.
In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929, Yale University Economics Professor Irving Fisher remained steadfast in his view that the boom in prices had been warranted, pointing to the myriad innovations of the 1920s, including the introduction of the electric unit drive and utility-supplied power. Dismissed by most, this view has since given way to Alan Greenspan’s view of irrational exuberance. This book presents a series of contemporary and period writings which rehabilitate the fundamentals view, showing why Irving Fisher was right. Whereas Fisher was unable to provide a convincing narrative for the crash, these writings point to the Hoover Administration’s tariff initiative, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill, as the key element which contributed to both the boom and the crash.
Presents a fundamentals interpretation of the Financial Meltdown of 2008. Attributes it to two innovations, namely factory automation and outsourcing, both of which contributed to lowering the wage income to GDP ratio, thus resulting in underincome. Underincome describes a situation in which markets are unable to monetize output (profits being a residual form of income), leading to stagnation, recession and ultimately, depression. Financial innovation begun in earnest in the early 1980's attempted to correct the underlying weakness. Consumer credit would shore up product markets. This policy worked for a quarter century (1983-2008), but was cut short by (i) the over-endebtedness of consumers and (ii) the collapse of the housing market. Discusses the various options available to the Obama Administration.
Provides a network approach to understanding trade and trade policy from Antiquity to the present. Argues that trade has occurred, is occurring, and will continue to occur within well-defined, stable networks (e.g. empires, multinational firms, free-trade areas). Is able to rationalize the many puzzles that currrently plague international economics. Results can be generalized to all trade activity, ranging from economic to social, to political.
Provides an alternative approach to modeling material processes in economics. Argues that material wealth (GDP) is an increasing function of two universal factor inputs, namely broadly-defined energy and broadly-defined organization. Uses the results to examine the productivity slowdown, the ICT revolution and the phenomenon of outsourcing. The latter is attributed to a desire on the part of firms/shareholders to capture a greater share of the relevant energy rents.
In this Volume, the various measures taken by successive Administrations to fully utilize the new-found potential are examined critically. These include the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The readings in this case consist of my own published work on the topic over the course of the past decade. The articles in question set out to do two things, namely situate the relevant policy measure in the appropriate historical context, namely the presence of output gaps, and second, evaluate the efficacy or wisdom of the proposed policy measures. For example, contrary to popular belief, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was a response to growing excess-capacity-related stagnation in the form of unemployment. Evidence is presented which shows that the output gaps referred to above were clearly on the minds of Ranking Republicans at the Kansas City National Convention in June 1928.
Does science matter in economics? It is generally agreed that economics is an applied science and not a pure one. In general, applied sciences are based on the laws and principles of pure science. A good example is biology, where the only laws that are invoked are those of physics, specifically the laws of classical mechanics and thermodynamics. Chemistry is another example, where the only laws that are invoked are those of physics. It is also generally agreed that economics draws from the tributary fields of industrial engineering and psychology, with the former underlying production and the latter, consumption and behavior in general. But, is this the case? Beyond hyperbole, is production ...
This book is part of a new generation of work on the events of the 1920s and 1930s, one that provides a gestalt view of this period. As such, the many events that have until now been viewed as unrelated, are viewed as parts of a greater whole, namely the introduction of a new power drive technology in the form of electric unit drive and its effects. The Roaring Twenties, the spectacular growth of the 1920s, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the Stock Market Boom and Crash, the decline in investment expenditure, the ensuing depression and the National Industrial Recovery Act are all shown to be related.
The decade of the 1920s is colloquially known as the Roaring Twenties, when modernity came to the U.S. and the World, ushering in a decade of unbounded growth and new-found optimism. GDP growth was particularly strong, as was employment and investment. However, as counterintuitive as it may sound or appear, the 1920s were also years of stagnation, stagnation that owed to the fact that the new, greater potential was not being fully exploited. In other words, while things were great, they still fell short of the potential that had been created, resulting in a form of "growth stagnation." That is, stagnation in the midst of what was exceptional growth. Bernard C. Beaudreau is Professor of Economics at Université Laval in Quebec, Canada.