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From the post-World War II era through the Cold War, post-Cold War era, and current war on terrorism, this volume assesses how U.S. presidential decisionmaking style and administrative structure can work in favor of, as well as against, the nation-building goals of the U.S. government and military and those of its coalition partners and allies.
Claude Chabrol's second film follows the fortunes of two cousins: Charles, a hard-working student who has arrived in Paris from his small hometown; and Paul, the dedicated hedonist who puts him up. Despite their differences in temperament, the two young men strike up a close friendship, until an attractive woman comes between them.
Since the "surge" in Iraq in 2006, counterinsurgency effectively became America's dominant approach for fighting wars. Yet many of the major controversies and debates surrounding counterinsurgency have turned not on military questions but on legal ones: Who can the military attack with drones? Is the occupation of Iraq legitimate? What tradeoffs should the military make between self-protection and civilian casualties? What is the right framework for negotiating with the Taliban? How can we build the rule of law in Afghanistan? The Counterinsurgent's Constitution tackles this wide range of legal issues from the vantage point of counterinsurgency strategy. Ganesh Sitaraman explains why law mat...
Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush Administration. It rejects the ’rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.
The foreign policy of the United States is guided by deeply held beliefs, few of which are recognized much less subjected to rational analysis, Christopher J. Fettweis writes, in this, his third book. He identifies the foundations of those beliefs - fear, honor, glory and hubris - and explains how they have inspired poor strategic decisions in Washington. He then proceeds to discuss their origins. The author analyzes recent foreign policy mistakes, including the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War, and he considers the decision-making process behind them, as well as the beliefs inspiring those decisions. The American government's strategic performance, Professor Fettweis argues, can be improved if these pathological beliefs are recognized and eliminated.
The inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars who changed the way the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars, against fierce resistance from within their own ranks.
This book examines the history of nation-building in Kosova as a model of how the theories behind nation-building, state-building and peace-building can succeed or fail. The author argues that two missing factors led to successful state-building but failed nation-building in Kosova: the balance of power and the ethnic elite. The author uses his unique expert knowledge gained over thirty years of study to present a thorough overview of international administration and nation-building in Kosova.
This book is about the origins and evolution of peacebuilding as a concept, the creation and functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as an institution, and the complicated relationship between these two processes.
War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.