You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
An introduction to the modern theory of economic design, this book develops an up-to-date treatment of the adjudication of conflicting claims. In addition to covering all aspects of claims problems, it links claims problems with other economic literatures, most prominently the game theory literature.
Muchas mujeres que se han dedicado a la ciencia, en particular a las matemáticas, son poco conocidas y reconocidas. Sin embargo, han realizado grandes aportaciones al álgebra, a la geometría o al cálculo, por citar algunas disciplinas. Probablemente, a pesar de las muchas prohibiciones que han sufrido las mujeres a lo largo de la historia, las matemáticas tienen un matiz especial: la fase más creativa puede realizarse muchas veces en solitario. ¿Y quién puede prohibirte pensar? ¿Quién puede controlar tu imaginación? Mujeres matemáticas. Trece matemáticas, trece espejos es un homenaje a las mujeres que, a pesar de todas las vicisitudes sufridas, han "brillado" en matemáticas. Pero también desea reconocer a aquellas que han sabido enseñar y transmitir con pasión esta materia durante generaciones y generaciones.
This volume comprises papers presented at the Symposium on Collective Choice, by leading experts in this field. It presents recent advances in Social Choice Theory and Welfare Economics. The papers are classified in two broad groups: (1) those dealing with the ethical aspects of the theory of social choice and (2) those concerned with the positive aspects. The papers in the first part are concerned with the Arrow-type aggregation problem or aspects of it and with more specific questions relating to optimality, justice and welfare. In part II several papers discuss the problem of strategic misre
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods. - Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory - Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation - Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making - Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes