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Normal Accidents analyzes the social side of technological risk. Charles Perrow argues that the conventional engineering approach to ensuring safety--building in more warnings and safeguards--fails because systems complexity makes failures inevitable. He asserts that typical precautions, by adding to complexity, may help create new categories of accidents. (At Chernobyl, tests of a new safety system helped produce the meltdown and subsequent fire.) By recognizing two dimensions of risk--complex versus linear interactions, and tight versus loose coupling--this book provides a powerful framework for analyzing risks and the organizations that insist we run them. The first edition fulfilled one reviewer's prediction that it "may mark the beginning of accident research." In the new afterword to this edition Perrow reviews the extensive work on the major accidents of the last fifteen years, including Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Challenger disaster. The new postscript probes what the author considers to be the "quintessential 'Normal Accident'" of our time: the Y2K computer problem.
This classic in organizational theory provides a succinct overview of the principal schools of thought as it presents a critical, sociopsychological, and historical orientation to the field of organizational analysis. Vividly written, with theories made concrete by specific, student-oriented examples, it takes a critical view toward organizations, analyzing their impact on individuals, groups, and society as a whole. New chapters on economic theories of organization and the conditional power theory are among the features of this revised edition.
The modern age with its emphasis on technical rationality has enabled a new and dangerous form of evil--administrative evil. Unmasking Administrative Evil discusses the overlooked relationship between evil and public affairs, as well as other fields and professions in public life. The authors argue that the tendency toward administrative evil, as manifested in acts of dehumanization and genocide, is deeply woven into the identity of public affairs. The common characteristic of administrative evil is that ordinary people within their normal professional and administrative roles can engage in acts of evil without being aware that they are doing anything wrong. Under conditions of moral inversi...
Post Normal Accident revisits Perrow’s classic Normal Accident published in 1984 and provides additional insights to our sociological view of safety-critical organisations. The operating landscape of high-risk systems has indeed profoundly changed in the past 20 to 30 years but the core sociological models of safety remain associated with classics of the 1980s and 1990s. This book examines the conceptual and empirical evolutions of the past two to three decades to explore their implications for safety management based on several strands of works in various research traditions in safety (e.g. cognitive engineering and system safety, high-reliability organisation, sociology of safety, regula...
In introducing this reader comprising three dozen articles and critiques in organizational sociology, Handel (sociology, U. of Wisconsin-Madison) overviews definitional issues over the term organization as viewed by rational theories and open systems theories. Starting with classic theories of bur
Using a variety of economic, financial, and political indicators, this book demonstrates that the global system has become an 'architecture of collapse'. The global financial crisis of 2008, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and China, and the European sovereign debt crisis illustrate the causes and the consequences of global instability
Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the apparently excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster.
In this volume the authors develop a systematic and chronologically based critique of the major concepts, figures and schools in organization. Themes discussed include: the development of scientific management and the responses of Gramsci and Lenin to it the meaning of Mayo and the Human Relations School the development of typological systems and contingency models of the organization key concepts of goals, environment and technology.