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Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding
"What is knowledge? What is understanding? Why should we care about them? And how much, if anything, can we know and understand? These are among the most fundamental questions in the theory of knowledge. This book develops a new way of answering all of them in a systematic manner. The key idea is to approach these questions by thinking about inquiry. It argues that knowledge and understanding are the central aims of inquiry and that this insight serves to shed light on the nature, value, and extent of our knowledge and understanding"--Publisher's description.
Good Thinking
This book combines virtue reliabilism with knowledge first epistemology to develop novel accounts of knowledge and justified belief. It is virtue reliabilist in that knowledge and justified belief are accounted for in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue reliabilism, it does not unpack the notion of epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. In addition, the book aims to show that this version of knowledge first virtue reliabilism serves to provide novel solutions to a number of core epistemological problems and, as a result, compares favourably with alternative versions of virtue reliabilism both in the traditionalist and in the knowledge first camp. This is the first ever book-length development of knowledge first virtue reliabilism, and it will contribute to recent debates in these two growing areas of epistemology.
Sharing Knowledge
This book develops a novel account of assertion in terms of its function of sharing knowledge.
The Nature and Normativity of Defeat
Defeat is the loss of justification for believing something in light of new information. This Element mainly aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism and argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory. As a result, any viable account of defeat must be externalist. While there is no shortage of externalist accounts, the Element provides reason to think that extant accounts remain unsatisfactory. The Element also explains the constructive tasks of developing an alternative account of defeat and showing that it improves on the competition.
Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology
This volume brings together new essays on virtue epistemology, one of the leading approaches in the theory of knowledge.
Explaining Understanding
What does it mean to understand something? What types of understanding can be distinguished? Is understanding always provided by explanations? And how is it related to knowledge? Such questions have attracted considerable interest in epistemology recently. These discussions, however, have not yet engaged insights about explanations and theories developed in philosophy of science. Conversely, philosophers of science have debated the nature of explanations and theories, while dismissing understanding as a psychological by-product. In this book, epistemologists and philosophers of science together address basic questions about the nature of understanding, providing a new overview of the field. False theories, cognitive bias, transparency, coherency, and other important issues are discussed. Its 15 original chapters are essential reading for researchers and graduate students interested in the current debates about understanding.
A Telic Theory of Trust
What is it to trust well? How do we do it? If we think of trust as a kind of aimed performance, capable of not only success but also of competence and aptness, our understanding of what it is to trust well can be put on an entirely new footing. A Telic Theory of Trust takes up this project, and in doing so, makes use of the core 'trust as performance' idea, developed and refined in substantive detail, in the service of explaining a range of philosophically important questions: the nature and varieties of trust, the evaluative norms that govern good trusting and distrusting (both implicit and deliberative), how trust relates to vulnerability, risk, negligence, and monitoring, as well as to trustworthiness and, more generally, to our practices of cooperation. The result, a telic theory of trust, opens up new conceptual possibilities and a research agenda in the philosophy of trust that is methodologically in the spirit of virtue epistemology, but which takes on its own distinctive shape.
Knowledge First
This volume features 13 original essays from leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of knowledge-first philosophy. The contributors' essays focus on both foundational issues and applications of knowledge-first philosophy to other disciplines, including the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of perception, and ethics.
EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009
This is a collection of high-quality research papers in the philosophy of science, deriving from papers presented at the second meeting of the European Philosophy of Science Association in Amsterdam, October 2009.
Virtue Epistemology Naturalized
This book presents four bridges connecting work in virtue epistemology and work in philosophy of science (broadly construed) that may serve as catalysts for the further development of naturalized virtue epistemology. These bridges are: empirically informed theories of epistemic virtue; virtue theoretic solutions to under determination; epistemic virtues in the history of science; and the value of understanding. Virtue epistemology has opened many new areas of inquiry in contemporary epistemology including: epistemic agency, the role of motivations and emotions in epistemology, the nature of abilities, skills and competences, wisdom and curiosity. Value driven epistemic inquiry has become qui...
