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A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.
Pub_AbstractText: This thesis proposes an alternative governance structure for east central Europe - the Intermarium. The Intermarium is based on the development of a supplementary federal structure capable of controlling factionalism and nationalism utilizing concepts from James Madison's Tenth Federalist. In particular, James Madison's approach to mitigating and preventing the formation of dangerous factions is found to be compatible with preexisting notions of federalism in east central Europe and offers a potential regional political solution that merits further study. In reaching the above proposal, the concepts of Wilsonian national self -determination, Pan European federalism, functio...
This collection of essays originated in a series of seminars given at the summer courses of the Academy of European Law at the European University Institute, Florence in 1999.
As all manner of commerce becomes increasingly global, states must establish laws to protect property rights, human rights, and national security. In many cases, states delegate authority to resolve disputes regarding these laws to an independent court, whose power depends upon its ability to enforce its rulings. Examining detailed case studies of the International Court of Justice and the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the World Trade Organization, Leslie Johns finds that a court’s design has nuanced and mixed effects on international cooperation. A strong court is ideal when laws are precise and the court is nested within a political structure like the European Union. Strong courts encourage litigation but make states more likely to comply with agreements when compliance is easy and withdraw from agreements when it is difficult. A weak court is optimal when law is imprecise and states can easily exit agreements with minimal political or economic repercussions. Johns concludes the book with recommendations for promoting cooperation by creating more precise international laws and increasing both delegation and obligation to international courts.
These are momentous times for the comparative analysis of judicial behaviour. Once the sole province of U.S. scholars—and mostly political scientists at that—now, researchers throughout the world, drawing on history, economics, law, and psychology, are illuminating how and why judges make the choices they do and what effect those choices have on society. Bringing together leading scholars in the field, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Judicial Behaviour consists of ten sections, each devoted to important subfields: fundamentals—providing overviews designed to identify common trends in courts worldwide; approaches to judging; data, methods, and technologies; staffing the courts; advoc...
An assessment of judicial convergence and fragmentation in international human rights law and their legal and non-legal triggering factors.
This book looks at the link between votes and political party systems in Asian democracies, focusing on India, Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines. It discusses this link in terms of three distinct elements: the formation of voters' preferences, the translation of preferences into votes, and the translation of votes into seats, and explores the extent to which electoral rules and social structural variables affect the process of transforming votes into a Asian political party system.
Although legislation has in the past decades become the legal cornerstone of European integration, the EU legislature remains systematically neglected in EU legal scholarship. This book explores the virtues of the legislative process and the nature of legislative acts and asks how moving the legislature from the sidelines to the centre of legal analysis changes our understanding of the EU Court of Justice's role. The first part of the book examines how the CJEU should exercise its authority relative to the legislature. The author argues that as the legislature lends democratic legitimacy to EU law and is a better lawmaker than the judiciary, that judicial deference to the legislature's choices is required in all but exceptional circumstances. The second part of the book sets forth a theory of legislative interpretation that enables judicial officials to respect the wishes of the legislature. This theory shows, first, that the legislature can aggregate the intentions of individual legislators into a coherent legislative intent, and second, how this legislative intent can be identified from the publicly available legislative material.
Explains why international courts underutilize their power and traces how this impacts international norms through legal and social science-based analyses.