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In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
This is a collection of essays, written by members of the British Commission for Military History. They examine key aspects of the experience of US and British armies, ranging from the American Civil War to the most recent example of high-intensity manoeuvre war, to the Gulf Conflict of 1991.
For the US Army to succeed in the 21st Century, Soldiers of all ranks must understand and use Mission Command. Mission Command empowers leaders at all levels, allowing them to synchronize all warfighting functions and information systems to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against a range of adversaries. This collection of historical vignettes seeks to sharpen our understanding of Mission Command philosophy and practice by providing examples from the past in which Mission Command principles played a decisive role. Some vignettes show junior officers following their commander's intent and exercising disciplined initiative in very chaotic combat operations. Others recount how field grade officers built cohesive teams that relied on mutual trust to achieve key operational objectives. Each historical account is complemented by an annotated explanation of how the six Mission Command principles shaped the action. For this reason, the collection is ideal for leader development in the Army school system as well as for unit and individual professional development. Mission Command places great responsibility on our Soldiers.
“An excellent, vividly written” (The Washington Post) account of leadership in wartime that explores how four great democratic statesmen—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion—worked with the military leaders who served them during warfare. The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show—the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot A. Cohen expertly argues that great statesmen do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their gener...
Raphael Israeli's overview of Islamic martyrology focuses upon the situation that has developed worldwide since the World Trade Centre was destroyed. His thesis is that a sea-change has occurred in international terrorism that supersedes all other perspectives.
Experienced commanders discuss anecdotes and case studies from their past operations.
An important new work that will change the way we think about and understand battles
A "Dutch-Uncle" approach to advising those who assume "first" command. Written by an Army officer primarily for Army company commanders, the book contains information, suggestions, & insights applicable to other services. A ready reference for the company commander. Identifies tasks to complete & how to set new directions for the company; inspires confidence to command with authority. Includes chapters on military justice & administrative law matters. Comprehensive do's & don'ts of a winning command philosophy.
This book brings together experienced military leaders and researchers in the human sciences to offer current operational experience and scientific thought on the issue of military command, with the intention of raising awareness of the uniquely human aspects of military command. It includes chapters on the personal experiences of senior commanders, new concepts and treatises on command theory, and empirical findings from experimental studies in the field.
Written by a retired British Army Major General, eveals how the highest levels of the British military focused on making plans work rather than questioning whether such goals made military sense