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Ukraine?Crimea?Russia
The Crimea was the only region of Ukraine in the 1990s where separatism arose and inter-ethnic conflict potentially could have taken place between the Ukrainian central government, ethnic Russians in the Crimea, and Crimean Tatars. Such a conflict would have inevitably drawn in Russia and Turkey. Russia had large numbers of troops in the Crimea within the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine also was a nuclear military power until 1996. This book analyses two inter-related issues. Firstly, it answers the question why Ukraine-Crimea-Russia traditionally have been a triangle of conflict over a region that Ukraine, Tatars and Russia have historically claimed. Secondly, it explains why inter-ethnic violence was averted in Ukraine despite Crimea possessing many of the ingredients that existed for Ukraine to follow in the footsteps of inter-ethnic strife in its former Soviet neighbourhood in Moldova (Trans-Dniestr), Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh), Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), and Russia (Chechnya).
The Crimea
Russia has always had a difficult time accepting Ukraine as an independent state--and even more trouble acknowledging Ukraine's sovereignty over the Crimea and the port of Sevastopol. The signing of an interstate treaty in 1997 recognizing the Russian-Ukrainian border paved the way for a compromise twenty-year Russian lease of the Sevastopol navy base for the Black Sea Fleet. Several factors have unraveled this compromise, including Russia's desire to reestablish itself internationally as a Great Power, the 2004 Orange Revolution, and the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia. Taras Kuzio addresses these factors and more in an in-depth analysis of Russian-Ukraine relations and the future of the Crimea and the port of Sevastopol.
Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February–March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February–late May 2014). It examines Russia’s approach, draws inferences from Moscow’s intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere.
