You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
This book provides a comprehensive overview of funding arrangements for explicit deposit insurance schemes. Responding to international guidelines and best practice, it discusses policy decisions and operational challenges which deposit insurers face in the financial management of ex-ante deposit insurance funds. Numerous examples are provided, and solutions offered on sources and uses of funds, focusing on target and optimal funding. Coverage includes: the role that modern deposit insurance schemes play in ensuring financial stability how to design the main deposit insurance features in order to maximize compliance with international standards the different types of funding and financial planning for deposit insurance methods for setting the target fund size level optimal deposit insurance funding challenges faced by the European Union members following new deposit insurance and bank resolution directives. The book concludes by providing a comprehensive overview of funding issues and recommendations for deposit insurance schemes in the European Union.
In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.
None