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The Riskiness of Credit Origins and Downside Risks to Economic Activity
We construct a country-level indicator capturing the extent to which aggregate bank credit growth originates from banks with a relatively riskier profile, which we label the Riskiness of Credit Origins (RCO). Using bank-level data from 42 countries over more than two decades, we document that RCO variations over time are a feature of the credit cycle. RCO also robustly predicts downside risks to GDP growth even after controlling for aggregate bank credit growth and financial conditions, among other determinants. RCO’s explanatory power comes from its relationship with asset quality, investor and banking sector sentiment, as well as future banking sector resilience. Our findings underscore the importance of bank heterogeneity for theories of the credit cycle and financial stability policy.
Spillover Implications of China's Slowdown for International Trade
Using a panel vector autoregression and a novel measure of export-intensity-adjusted final demand, this note studies spillovers from China’s economic transition on export growth in 46 advanced and emerging market economies. The analysis suggests that a 1 percentage point shock to China’s final demand growth reduces the average country’s export growth by 0.1–0.2 percentage point. The impact is largest in Emerging Asia, where an export-growth-accounting exercise suggests that China’s economic transition has reduced average export growth rates by 1 percentage point since early 2014. Other countries linked to China’s manufacturing sector, as well as commodity exporters, are also significantly affected. This suggests that trading partners need to adjust to an environment of weaker external demand as China completes its transition to a more sustainable growth model.
External Sector Report, July 2019
The IMF’s 2019 External Sector Report shows that global current account balances stand at about 3 percent of global GDP. Of this, about 35–45 percent are now deemed excessive. Meanwhile, net credit and debtor positions are at historical peaks and about four times larger than in the early 1990s. Short-term financing risks from the current configuration of external imbalances are generally contained, as debtor positions are concentrated in reserve-currency-issuing advanced economies. An intensification of trade tensions or a disorderly Brexit outcome—with further repercussions for global growth and risk aversion—could, however, affect other economies that are highly dependent on foreign demand and external financing. With output near potential in most systemic economies, a well-calibrated macroeconomic and structural policy mix is necessary to support rebalancing. Recent trade policy actions are weighing on global trade flows, investment, and growth, including through confidence effects and the disruption of global supply chains, with no discernible impact on external imbalances thus far.
Corporate Funding and the COVID-19 Crisis
This paper assesses whether corporate liquidity needs in the G7 economies were met during the containment phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (February-June 2020) using various approaches to identify credit supply shocks. The pandemic crisis adversely affected nonfinancial corporate sector cash flows, generating liquidity and solvency pressures. However, corporate borrowing surged in March and into the second quarter, thanks to credit line drawdowns and unprecedented policy support. In the United States, the bond market was buoyant from the end of March onward, but credit supply conditions for bank loans and the syndicated loan market tightened. In other G7 economies, credit supply conditions generally eased somewhat across markets during the second quarter. Among listed firms, entities with weaker liquidity or solvency positions before the onset of COVID-19, as well as smaller firms, suffered relatively more financial stress in some economies in the early stages of the crisis. Residual signs of strain remained as of the end of June. Policy interventions, especially those directly targeting the corporate sector, had a beneficial effect on credit supply overall.
House Price Synchronicity, Banking Integration, and Global Financial Conditions
We examine the relationship between house price synchronicity and global financial conditions across 40 countries and about 70 cities over the past three decades. The role played by cross-border banking flows in residential property markets is examined as well. Looser global financial conditions are associated with greater house price synchronicity, even after controlling for bilateral financial integration. Moreover, we find that synchronicity across major cities may differ from that of their respective countries’, perhaps due to the influence of global investors on local house price dynamics. Policy choices such as macroprudential tools and exchange rate flexibility appear to be relevant for mitigating the sensitivity of domestic housing markets to the rest of the world.
Asean Bond Market Development
Since the Asian crisis, ASEAN5 countries have expended considerable effort in trying to develop their domestic bond markets. Yet today these markets are not much larger, relative to GDP, than they were a decade before. How can we explain this? And does this mean that domestic markets have not, in fact, developed? The paper argues that bond market growth has been held back by a sharp fall in investment rates, which has left firms with little need for bond borrowing. Even so, markets have developed in other ways, to such an extent that substantial amounts of foreign portfolio investment have begun to flow into ASEAN5 bonds. These developments have important ramifications. With the investor base growing and infrastructure investment likely to rise, ASEAN5 bond markets could expand rapidly over the next decade, holding out the prospect that the region could finally achieve "twin engine" financial systems.
Can Countries Manage Their Financial Conditions Amid Globalization?
This paper examines the evolving importance of common global components underlying domestic financial conditions. It develops financial conditions indices (FCIs) that make it possible to compare a large set of advanced and emerging market economies. It finds that a common component, “global financial conditions,” accounts for about 20 percent to 40 percent of the variation in countries’ domestic FCIs, with notable heterogeneity across countries. Its importance, however, does not seem to have increased markedly over the past two decades. Global financial conditions loom large, but evidence suggests that, on average, countries still appear to hold considerable sway over their own financial conditions—specifically, through monetary policy. Nevertheless, the rapid speed at which foreign shocks affect domestic financial conditions may also make it difficult to react in a timely and effective manner, if deemed necessary.
China’s Growing Influence on Asian Financial Markets
This paper finds that financial spillovers from China to regional markets are on the rise. The main transmission channel appears to be trade linkages, although direct financial linkages are playing an increasing role. Without an impact on global risk premiums, China’s influence on regional markets is not yet to the level of the United States, but comparable to that of Japan. If China-related shocks are coupled with a rise in global risk premiums, as in August 2015 and January 2016, spillovers to the region could be significantly larger. Over the medium term, China’s financial spillovers could rise further with tighter financial linkages with the region, including through the ongoing internationalization of the renminbi and China’s capital account liberalization.
Trade Tensions, Global Value Chains, and Spillovers
Europe is deeply integrated into global value chains and recent trade tensions raise the question of how European economies would be affected by the introduction of tariffs or other trade barriers. This paper estimates the impact of trade shocks and growth spillovers using value added measures to better gauge the associated costs across European countries.
Spillovers from China’s Growth Slowdown and Rebalancing to the ASEAN-5 Economies
After many years of rapid expansion, China’s growth is slowing to more sustainable levels and is rebalancing, with consumption becoming the main growth driver. This transition is likely to have negative effects on its trading partners in the near term. This paper studies the potential spillovers to the ASEAN-5 economies through trade, commodity prices, and financial markets. It finds that countries with closer trade linkages with China (Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) and net commodity exporters (Indonesia and Malaysia) would suffer the largest impact, with growth falling between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points in response to a decline in China’s growth by 1 percentage point depending on the model used and the nature of the shock. The impact could be larger if China’s slowdown and rebalancing coincides with bouts of global financial volatility. There are also opportunities from China’s rebalancing, both in merchandise and services trade, and there is preliminary evidence that some ASEAN-5 economies are already benefiting from these trends.
