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Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium n...
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and ...
Game Theory
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Game Equilibrium Models III
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.
Equilibrium, Markets and Dynamics
This book contains essays in honour of Claus Weddepohl who, after 22 years, is retiring as professor of mathematical economics at the Department of Quantitative Economics of the University of Amsterdam. Claus Weddepohl may be viewed as th~ first Dutch mathematical economist in the general equi librium tradition of Arrow, Debreu and Hahn. The essays in this book are centered around the themes Equilibrium, Markets and Dynamics, that have been at the heart of Weddepohl's work on mathematical economics for more than three decades. The essays have been classified according to these three themes. Admittedly such a classification always is somewhat arbitrary, and most essays would in fact fit into ...
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been on...
Understanding Strategic Interaction
Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
A Celebration of John F. Nash Jr.
This collection celebrates the pathbreaking work in game theory and mathematics of John F. Nash Jr., winner of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics. Nash's analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games has had a major impact on modern economic theory. This book, also published as volume 81 of the Duke Mathematical Journal, includes an important, but previously unpublished paper by Nash; the proceedings of the Nobel seminar held in Stockholm on December 8, 1994 in his honor; and papers by distinguished mathematicians and economists written in response to and in honor of Nash's pioneering contributions to those fields. In 1950, when he was 22 years old, Nash presented his key idea...
National Legal Systems and Globalization
This book presents the results of research project financed by the Hague Institute for the Internationalization of Law (HiiL) and carried out at the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) of Tilburg University. The project team shows that globalization, instead of threatening national legal systems, put them in a new role and gives them continuing relevance. First of all, once one takes a more functional view of the law, based on law and economics and comparative law literature, harmonization or unification of national legal systems is no longer a foregone conclusion. Secondly, fundamental constitutional principles continue to bear in the era of multi-level and transnational governance: they become governance principles, divorced from specific institutional settings. Finally, looking beyond regulatory competition and comparative law, legal emulation provides a rich and fruitful model to explain the interplay between legal systems. This book explores these three themes, both at a theoretical level and in the light of specific examples.
