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Professor Hinsley's book, first published in 1966, offers a general survey of the history of the theory of sovereignty, which seeks to illuminate the theory's character and function by stressing the changing social, political and economic frameworks within and between the political societies in which it has developed. It also spans and connects the different intellectual aspects of the concept of sovereignty: philosophical, legal, historical and political. For this new edition Professor Hinsley has wholly rewritten the last chapter to bring the history up to date, and to make some new concluding remarks.
Volume 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War, Strategic Deception, brings the series to an end. Strategic deception depends for its success on the availability of good security and good intelligence. The first three volumes of the series described the intelligence channels that gave the Allies their incomparable insight into enemy capabilities and intentions.
The story of Bletchley Park, the successful intelligence operation that cracked Germany's Enigma Code. Photos.
A collection of essays in the honour of F. H. Hinsley, the foremost historian of British wartime intelligence.
In the last years of the nineteenth century peace proposals were first stimulated by fear of the danger of war rather than in consequence of its outbreak. In this study of the nature and history of international relations Mr Hinsley presents his conclusions about the causes of war and the development of men's efforts to avoid it. In the first part he examines international theories from the end of the middle ages to the establishment of the League of Nations in their historical setting. This enables him to show how far modern peace proposals are merely copies or elaborations of earlier schemes. He believes there has been a marked reluctance to test these theories not only against the formidable criticisms of men like Rousseau, Kant and Bentham, but also against what we have learned about the nature of international relations and the history of the practice of states. This leads him to the second part of his study - an analysis of the origins of the modern states' system and of its evolution between the eighteenth century and the First World War.
First published in 1951, this book examines Hitler's strategy and how it developed during the Second World War. Hinsley, who had worked as a code breaker during the war, uses a variety of contemporary documents as sources, including records taken from the German Naval Archives after its capture by the Allies in 1945. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in military history in general or the Second World War in particular.
Keith Wilson is Lecturer in International History at the University of Leeds.; This book is intended for undergraduate history courses: broad 20th century European history, First World War, military history, war studies, international and diplomatice history, school libraries.
The first three volumes of the series dealt with the influence of intelligence on strategy and operations. Volume 4 analyzes the contribution made by intelligence to the work of the authorities responsible for countering the threats of subversion, sabotage and intelligence gathering by the enemy in the United Kingdom and British territories overseas, and neutral countries. It describes the evolution of the security intelligence agencies between the wars and the security situation in September 1939. This volume reviews the arguments about security policy regarding enemy aliens, Fascists and Communists in the winter of 1939-1940 and during the Fifth Column panic in the summer of 1940. It describes how the security system, still at that time inadequately organized and poorly informed, was developed into an efficient machine and how, with invaluable help from signals intelligence and other sources and by the skillful use of double agents, the operation of the enemy intelligence services were effectively countered. In conclusion, it notes the consistent subservience of the Communist Party to the interests of the USSR and the likely threat to British security.