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The wheel of fortune
National security starts with strategic anticipation: what are the risks for the Dutch national security? How can the Netherlands prepare for this, and what choices and investments are needed in order to do so?
Volatility and friction in the age of disintermediation
Events unfolded once again at a swirling pace in 2016. Terrorists hit Europe’s capital in March. The British population voted for Brexit in June. Turkish armed forces failed to topple Erdoğan in July. A resurgent Russia flexed its military muscles again in the Middle East and actively interfered in American elections, in which the American population elected Trump, in November. We are worried but certainly not surprised by the volatility of contemporary international relations. In previous editions of our contribution to the Dutch government’s Strategic Monitor, we already observed a surge in assertive behavior, noted a dangerous uptick in crises, and warned for the contagiousness of po...
Taking the High Ground
The Royal Netherlands Air Force should invest in a mix of weapons systems to facilitate joint operations. Observation and prolonged surveillance is becoming an important task. Strategic cooperation with R&D institutes and the aerospace industry is crucial. The importance of air power lies in creating conditions for successful performance of sea, land, and air forces. Observation and prolonged surveillance will become a main task of the Air Force. Rapid technological developments in the use of unmanned systems and space resources are making this increasingly feasible and affordable.
Geopolitics and Maritime Security
This report contains the results from a research project aimed at identifying new capabilities for the future Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN). With the type of naval operations and tasks for the period up to 2030-35 largely enduring, the current "regional power projection" profile of the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) must be strengthened and renewed. We envisage the core of the future naval force to remain a versatile mix of surface and sub-surface combatants, shipborne helicopters and unmanned systems for intelligence purposes and extended force projection, modern amphibious forces and long-range land attack capability to counter Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) threats. All main vessels should be ocean-going, able to navigate the main operating theaters in the European seas and the Carib under all conditions. But even while we expect that naval operations and tasks, as well as the overall force profile of the RNLN, will evolve rather than drastically change, the RNLN must substantially innovate — but not beyond recognition — its personnel, materiel, doctrines and processes, organization and structures.
Strategic Monitor 2015: The return of ghosts hoped past?
The Return of Ghosts Hoped Past? Global Trends in Conflict and Cooperation, is HCSS’ most recent contribution to the Strategic Monitor and examines the longer-term security impact of these reappearing ghosts. Are the horrific events that dominated news agendas in 2014 - such as the downing of MH-17 and violent acts of IS - isolated incidents or part of a more structural trend? Did the ‘ghosts of the past’ ever really go away? In the report, HCSS addresses recent events and trends in light of overarching patterns of conflict.
Playing to Your Strengths
This report contains the results from a research project aimed at identifying new capabilities for the future RNLA. Rather than sketch a full future force profile, it concentrates on promising new, or to be renewed capabilities.
DE UITDAGING WAAR NEDERLAND VOOR STAAT: TERUGBLIK OP HET PROGRAMMA STRATEGY AND CHANGE
Dit rapport biedt een overzicht van vier jaar Strategy and Change.
SI VIS PACEM, PARA UTIQUE PACEM
Analyses of the international security environment typically provide somber overviews of the various drivers and manifestations of conflict and instability around the world. Recent developments such as the terrorist attacks in Paris, Beirut and elsewhere, a Middle East in flames, a resurgent Russia, incessant violence in West Africa or turmoil in South China Sea only reinforce this view. By framing our analysis of the security environment in these terms, debates about how to anticipate and respond to these current and future threats invariably focus on those forces of instability and conflict: how to identify threats and enemies and then eliminate them. This report is based on the premise that this conflict-centric mindset has led to portfolio choices in terms of strategies (‘what do we do and how do we do it?’), capabilities (‘what do we do it with?’), and partners (‘who do we do it with?’) that have been excessively onesided. This report argues that there is an alternative, complementary way of framing security that is equally real and equally actionable for defense and security organizations (DSOs4 ): a resilience-centric one.
Better Together
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