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The volume examines the experiences of professional Western combat soldiers' training and operations in Iraq, and seeks to explain the culture, motivations, and capabilities of the professional soldier in the twenty-first century.
Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both industrialized and developing nations attract ever-increasing numbers of people, outstripping rural growth rates worldwide. As a consequence of this population shift from the countryside to the cities, guerrilla conflict in urban areas, similar to the violent response to U.S. occupation in Iraq, will become more frequent. Urban Guerrilla Warfare traces the diverse origins of urban conflicts and identifies similarities and differences in the methods of counterinsurgent forces. In this wide-ranging and richly ...
During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental process of organizational adaptation—a process driven by soldiers an...
‘Nations appear and fall, but cities endure and rediscover how to succeed. In this meticulously defined and researched book, Glenn presents ideas for minimising suffering during urban catastrophes. His urgency identifies risks held in urban areas by 3.5 billion people. These people are many of us: as urban populations occupying 3 per cent of our planet’s land area, drawing water from 41 per cent of the world’s ground surface, consuming 60 to 80 per cent of global energy and achieving 80 per cent of the world’s economic productivity. For Glenn, our resilience—through diversity in preparation, survival and recovery—includes comprehensive approaches that are sustained in duration, o...
A compilation of thought-worthy essays from the faculty and staff of the U.S. Army's premier educational institution for civilian leadership and management, the Army Management Staff College.
Compares three units that conducted stability operations in the same area in northern Iraq-the 101st Airborne Division (which had only limited digital communications), the 3/2 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), and the 1/25 SBCT (both equipped with digital networks) and finds that leadership, training, and tactics and procedures are just as important as networking capabilities for improving mission effectiveness in stability operations.
An analysis of the performance of medium-armored forces across the range of military operations since World War I yields insights with significant implications for U.S. Army decisions about fielding these units in the future. The authors find that medium-armored forces fare poorly against competent, heavily armored opponents, and that the Stryker and Future Combat Systems will not fill the void created by the retirement of the M551 Sheridan.
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"The authors of this report seek to understand how network-centric operations (NCO) capabilities are a source of combat power for the Army's Stryker brigade and to determine the extent to which the tenets of NCO are realized by the unit. Using a broad range of measures of effectiveness, the authors compared the performance of a Stryker brigade with that of a nondigitized light infantry brigade in certification exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center and found that the Stryker brigade's superior networking capabilities, superior shared situational awareness, speed of command, and ability to control the speed of command vastly improved the brigade's performance in these exercises. Using NCO measures of effectiveness, this analysis sheds light on the NCO capabilities that made the Stryker brigade a more agile and effective combat force. The authors conclude by discussing the potential implications of future NCO capabilities for future Army forces."--BOOK JACKET.
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