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In everyday life we either express our beliefs in all-or-nothing terms or we resort to numerical probabilities: I believe it's going to rain or my chance of winning is one in a million. 'The Stability of Belief' develops a theory of rational belief that allows us to reason with all-or-nothing belief and numerical belief simultaneously.
The investigation of the mind has been one of the major concerns of our philosophical tradition and is still a dominant subject in modern philosophy and science. Many philosophers in the scientific tradition want to solve the "puzzles of the mind," but believe the "puzzles" to be puzzles of the brain. So, whilst the former think of the mental as something of its own kind, the latter deny that philosophy of mind has to do with anything else but the brain. Philosophers also believe that reduction is the way to go. Maybe the mental is brain-dependent and hence reducible to the physical, in some way. This volume collects contributions that comprise each view point, and incorporates articles by William Bechtel, Jerry Fodor, Jaegwon Kim, Jolle Proust, and Patrick Suppes.
Philosophers often have tried to either reduce "disagreeable" objects or concepts to (more) acceptable objects or concepts. Reduction is regarded attractive by those who subscribe to an ideal of ontological parsimony. But the topic is not just restricted to traditional metaphysics or ontology. In the philosophy of mathematics, abstraction principles, such as Hume's principle, have been suggested to support a reconstruction of mathematics by logical means only. In the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science, the logical analysis of language has long been regarded as the dominating paradigm, and liberalized projects of logical reconstruction remain to be driving forces of modern philosophy. This volume collects contributions comprising all these topics, including articles by Alexander Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, James Ladyman, Rohit Parikh, Gerhard Schurz, Peter Simons, Crispin Wright, and Edward N. Zalta.
Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2022 im Fachbereich Philosophie - Theoretische (Erkenntnis, Wissenschaft, Logik, Sprache), Note: 1,30, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft), Veranstaltung: Formale Wahrheitstheorien, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Dieser Satz ist falsch. Ist der Satz nun wahr oder falsch? Wenn er wahr ist, dann sagt der Satz ‚Dieser Satz ist falsch‘ eine Wahrheit aus, das heißt jedoch, dass eben dieser Satz falsch sein muss, um wahr zu sein, also ist er falsch. Das kann aber natürlich nicht sein, da wir angenommen haben, dass er wahr sein soll. Also muss die zweite Möglichkeit richtig sein, er muss falsch sein, o...
The Annual European Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, generally known as the Logic Colloquium, is the most prestigious annual meeting in the field. Many of the papers presented there are invited surveys of developments, and the rest of the papers are chosen to complement the invited talks. This 2007 volume includes surveys, tutorials, and selected research papers from the 2005 meeting. Highlights include three papers on different aspects of connections between model theory and algebra; a survey of major advances in combinatorial set theory; a tutorial on proof theory and modal logic; and a description of Bernay's philosophy of mathematics.
Abstractionism is a recent and much debated position in the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of 16 original articles by leading scholars covers a variety of topics concerning both the philosophy and mathematics of Abstractionism and includes an extensive introduction to the field by the editors.
In contrast to the prevailing tradition in epistemology, the focus in this book is on low-level inferences, i.e., those inferences that we are usually not consciously aware of and that we share with the cat nearby which infers that the bird which she sees picking grains from the dirt, is able to fly. Presumably, such inferences are not generated by explicit logical reasoning, but logical methods can be used to describe and analyze such inferences. Part 1 gives a purely system-theoretic explication of belief and inference. Part 2 adds a reliabilist theory of justification for inference, with a qualitative notion of reliability being employed. Part 3 recalls and extends various systems of dedu...
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). He draws on decision theory in order to justify the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, and sets out a veritistic account of epistemic utility.
What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives, sometimes as a result of decisions we make--such as when we choose to become a parent or move to a new country--and sometimes as a result of forces beyond our control--such as when our political views change as we grow older. This poses a problem for any theory of how we ought to make decisions. Which values and preferences should we appeal to when we are making our decisions? Our current values? Our past ones? Our future ones? Or some amalgamation of all them? But if that, which amalgamation? In Choosing for Changing Selves, Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions will affect those future times.