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Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.
A history of how the Russians, ever since the Six Day War, were involved in planning, instigating and supporting further Arab military action against Israel.
Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history.
In this book, first published in Hebrew in 1975 and now available in English for the first time with an introduction by Noam Chomsky, Amnon Kapeliouk traces the policies and attitudes that led to the 1973 Arab-Israel war. He describes the multiple diplomatic overtures from Egyptian presidents Nasser and Sadat after 1967 that Israel ignored or contemptuously rejected, as well as the complacent attitude that had become fully entrenched in the Israeli military establishment. On the political level, the triumvirate of Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and Israel Galili feature prominently as a study in arrogance and incompetence. Kapeliouk also notes the protest movement that arose among active-duty soldiers as well as veterans in the wake of the war demanding political accountability for the failures of the war. Finally, the book examines Israel's policy of colonizing the territories occupied in 1967, starting with the Golan Heights and later spreading to the West Bank ("Judaea and Samaria") and the Sinai - a policy that did much to convince the leaders of Arab states that war was their only option. Introduced by Noam Chomsky and Irene Gendzier.
"Constitutes a close examination of the events leading up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and offers the first comparative analysis by Israeli, Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, American, and former Soviet military and diplomatic participants and scholars of that seminal event."-- Hermann F. Eilts, professor emeritus, Boston University, and former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt Contents 1. Introduction 2. The Failure of Diplomacy 3. The Failures of Deterrence and Intelligence 4. The Airlift 5. Crisis Management 6. The Endgame 7. Lessons Learned and Puzzles to Be Solved 8. Summing Up The October War provides insiders' views of the politics and diplomacy of events leading up to and followin...
The majority of narratives about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War stress that air power did not play a dominant role. The deployment of strong, well-integrated air defenses by Egypt and Syria, that caused heavy losses to the Israeli air force early during that conflict, not only spoiled Israel's prewar planning, but prevented it from providing support for Israeli ground forces too. A cross-examination of interviews with dozens of Egyptian participants in that conflict, contemporary reporting in the media, and also intelligence reports, offers an entirely different picture. Accordingly, for much of that war, the Israelis flew heavy air strikes on Port Said, on the northern entry to the Suez ...
Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An impo...
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Amerikansk bog om Yom Kippurkrigens politiske historie.
A NETFLIX ORIGINAL MOVIE THE BEST INTELLIGENCE BOOK for 2017 by The American Association of Former Intelligence Officers A gripping feat of reportage that exposes—for the first time in English—the sensational life and mysterious death of Ashraf Marwan, an Egyptian senior official who spied for Israel, offering new insight into the turbulent modern history of the Middle East. As the son-in-law of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and a close advisor to his successor, Anwar Sadat, Ashraf Marwan had access to the deepest secrets of the country’s government. But Marwan himself had a secret: He was a spy for the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service. Under the codename “The Angel,â€...