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Foreign Investment in American Telecommunications
Restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. telecommunications firms have harmed the interests of American consumers and investors, argues J. Gregory Sidak in this convincing study. Sidak shows why these restrictions, originally intended to protect America from the perils of wireless telegraphy by foreign agents, should be repealed. Basing his analysis on legislative history, statutory and constitutional interpretation, and finance and trade theory, Sidak shows that these restrictions no longer serve their national security purpose (if they ever did). Instead they deny American consumers lower prices and more robust innovation, hamper access of American investors to foreign telecommunications markets, and unconstitutionally impinge on freedom of speech. Sidak's study encompasses the Telecommunications Act of 1996, recent global mergers such as British Telecom-MCI, and the 1997 World Trade Organization agreement to liberalize trade in telecommunications services.
Competing with the Government: Anti-Competitive Behavior and Public Enterprises
"Examining a variety of instances in which government and private firms compete - including freight carriage, electric utilities, financial services, and others - the authors raise fundamental questions about the proper relationship between business and government in a market economy and underline the need for significant policy change regarding competition between government and private firms."--Jacket.
Competition and Regulation in Telecommunications
This volume brings together academic economists and lawyers to evaluate and compare the regulation of telecommunications markets in Germany and the United States. The unifying theme in all of the pa pers is that the goal of public policy in this area should be to make the broadest and most functional competition possible by means of an ap propriate regulatory framework. Because the European and American telecommunications markets are becoming more intertwined each day, the issues addressed in this volume will be topical to the business, government, and academic communities for some time. For the chairman of the Monopoly Commission, Wernhard Moschel, the opening of the German telecommunications market has been successful in principle. This is clearly recognizable in the case of the competition in long-distance transport. Based on the view that the regulatory authority should make itself obsolete, Professor Moschel advocates an incremental review and gradual reduction of regulation.
Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract
This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies termed 'deregulatory takings' that threaten private property in network industries without compensation.
Toward Competition in Local Telephony
This book discusses local competition in the telecommunications sector.
Protecting Competition from the Postal Monopoly
The Private Express Statutes protect the U.S. Postal Service from competition in the delivery of letter mail. In contrast, few if any corresponding rules protect competition in other areas from the federal government's postal monopoly. Not only are the Postal Service's competitive activities arguably unrestricted by any explicit application of antitrust law, but public ownership and control exempt the Postal Service's actions from the corporate governance that is characteristic of private enterprises. The Postal Service can take advantage of its autonomy and protected letter mail monopoly to subsidize its entry and expansion in competitive markets, such as parcel post and express mail. That ...
Governing the Postal Service
Six articles contribute to the attention on the U.S. Postal Service in response to advances in telecommunications and communications and new thinking about regulated industries.
Transmission Pricing and Stranded Costs in the Electric Power Industry
Stranded costs are those costs that electric utilities currently permitted to recover through their rates but whose recovery may be impeded or prevented by the advent of competition in the industry. Estimates of those costs run from the tens to the hundreds of billions of dollars. Should regulators permit utilities to recover stranded costs while they take steps to promote competition in the electric power industry? William J. Baumol and J. Gregory Sidak argue that on both efficiency and equity grounds the answer to that question should be yes. The authors show that a transmission price, the price for sending electricity over the transmission grid, can be determined in a manner that is compatible with economic efficiency and clearly neutral in its effects upon all competitors in electricity generation. A correctly constructed regime of transmission pricing may in fact achieve the efficiency and equity goals that justify the recovery of stranded costs.
Negotiating FRAND Licenses in Good Faith
This article has two messages. First, any set of principles for defining whether a fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) negotiation has transpired in good faith must identify what economists who work on questions of market design call activity rules and closing rules. Judges, practicing lawyers, legal scholars, and government officials working on the defining of principles for good-faith negotiation of FRAND licenses for standard-essential patents (SEPs) have not recognized that need. Nor, to my knowledge, has any academic economist or expert economic witness commented on this lacuna.Second, the American jurisprudence on offer, acceptance, and contract formation fortuitously has t...
