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Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
This volume is based on lectures given at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on "Stochastic Games and Applications," which took place at Stony Brook, NY, USA, July 1999. It gives the editors great pleasure to present it on the occasion of L.S. Shapley's eightieth birthday, and on the fiftieth "birthday" of his seminal paper "Stochastic Games," with which this volume opens. We wish to thank NATO for the grant that made the Institute and this volume possible, and the Center for Game Theory in Economics of the State University of New York at Stony Brook for hosting this event. We also wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, for providing continuing financial support, without wh...
Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concerns some aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley's original 1953 paper defining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubik applying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley's 1969 paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume. The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in the volume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley's other major contributions to game theory. The other chapters cover the reformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have been inspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study of coalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, to problems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utility is not transferable.
Signaling Pathways in Liver Diseases, Third Edition again provides hepatologists and hepatology researchers with an expert overview of the complex and novel cellular/extracellular signaling pathways in the liver, and their role in liver diseases. The last few years have seen a great number of developments in this field, which in turn have led to new opportunities for innovative treatments; however, the intricacy of these pathways and their interactions continue to provide a real challenge for clinicians. This outstanding book compiles the emerging knowledge into a single expert resource, cataloguing and organizing it into an accessible and understandable format. With increased focus on the c...
This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
Explore the complexities of political strategy with "Game Theory," a key volume in the "Political Science" series. This book delves into how mathematical models reveal the dynamics of conflict and cooperation among rational actors. Chapters Overview: 1. Game Theory - Foundations of strategic decision-making. 2. Nash Equilibrium - Stable strategies against opponents' actions. 3. Evolutionarily Stable Strategy - Strategies that resist invasion in populations. 4. Chicken (Game) - Balancing risk and reward in strategic interactions. 5. Coordination Game - Achieving mutual benefits through strategic alignment. 6. Centipede Game - Trust and betrayal in sequential decision-making. 7. Strategy (Game...
Outstanding works showing the application of game theory to economic theory.
This book is meant for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory.
This book develops a general solution concept for strategic games which resolves strategic uncertainty completely. The concept is described by a mathematically formulated solution procedure and illustrated by applying it to many interesting examples. A long nontechnical introduction tries to survey and to discuss the more technical parts of the book. The book and especially the introduction provide firm and consistent guidance for scholars of game theory. There are many open problems which could inspire further research efforts.