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There has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny.
Leading philosophers and psychologists offer a rigorous assessment of the commonsense view that perceptual experience is an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects. They examine the nature of perception, its role in the acquisition of knowledge, the role of causation in perception, and how perceptual understanding develops in humans.
Leading figures working in the philosophy of action debate foundational issues relating to the causal theory of action. The causal theory of action (CTA) is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while others focus on recent developments; some rely on th...
There is a tendency, in contemporary epistemology, to treat 'perceptual knowledge' and 'self-knowledge' as labels for different and largely unconnected sets of philosophical problems. The project of this volume is to bring out how much is to be gained from treating the two topics as, on the contrary, intimately connected. One set of questions that comes into view when we do concerns the sense in which perceptual knowledge, as understood from the first-person perspective, seem to be 'direct'. In a famous passage, Austin contrasted reliance on what we call 'evidence' with the way perceptual experience 'settles' questions. How should we understand the difference? In what sense is perceptual kno...
Twelve essays explore what bearing empirical findings might have on philosophical concerns about counterfactuals and causation, and how, in turn, work in philosophy might help clarify issues in empirical work on the relationships between causal and counterfactual thought.
In this collection of essays, experts in the field of consciousness research shed light on the intricate relationship between conscious and unconscious states of mind. Advancing the debate on consciousness research, this book puts centre stage the topic of commonalities and differences between conscious and unconscious contents of the mind. The collection of cutting-edge chapters offers a breadth of research perspectives, with some arguing that unconscious states have been unjustly overlooked and deserve recognition for their richness and wide scope. Others contend that significant differences between conscious and unconscious states persist, highlighting the importance of their distinct cha...
Matthew Soteriou provides an original philosophical account of sensory and cognitive aspects of consciousness. He explores distinctions of temporal character in our mental lives—especially in relation to the exercise of agency—and illuminates the more general issue of the place and role of mental action in the metaphysics of mind.
This work is a major biennial volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field of epistemology.
An influential and important volume which changed understandings of the ways in which philosophy of mind is conceived and understood.
The chapters in the book address the problem of reference as it relates to perception and to debates about realism.