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This anthology is the first book to give a balanced overview of the competing theories of degrees of belief. It also explicitly relates these debates to more traditional concerns of the philosophy of language and mind and epistemic logic.
This book presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework.
Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology provides an accessible introduction to the key concepts and principles of the Bayesian formalism. Volume 2 introduces applications of Bayesianism to confirmation and decision theory, then gives a critical survey of arguments for and challenges to Bayesian epistemology.
In everyday life we normally express our beliefs in all-or-nothing terms: I believe it is going to rain; I don't believe that my lottery ticket will win. In other cases, if possible, we resort to numerical probabilities: my degree of belief that it is going to rain is 80%; the probability that I assign to my ticket winning is one in a million. It is an open philosophical question how all-or-nothing belief and numerical belief relate to each other, and how we ought to reason with them simultaneously. The Stability of Belief develops a theory of rational belief that aims to answer this question by building new bridges between logic and probability theory, traditional and mathematical epistemol...
"De se statements are emphatic assertions in which speakers make fundamental claims about either themselves or others. In English, they are usually conveyed via "I" statements or third person reflexive pronouns, e.g. "she herself," "he himself." De seattitudes appear often in our day-to-day lives, but they also pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume teases out what de se attitudes connote linguistically and also what these statements reveal about how humans think about themselves and how they understand the world around them. "--
The Matrix trilogy is unique among recent popular films in that it is constructed around important philosophical questions--classic questions which have fascinated philosophers and other thinkers for thousands of years. Editor Christopher Grau here presents a collection of new, intriguing essays about some of the powerful and ancient questions broached by The Matrix and its sequels, written by some of the most prominent and reputable philosophers working today. They provide intelligent, accessible, and thought-provoking examinations of the philosophical issues that support the films. Philosophers Explore The Matrix includes an introduction that surveys the use of philosophical ideas in the f...
How do you do philosophy? Do you believe according to the evidence? Make inferences? Or conduct a scientific-based thought experiment? Methods in Analytic Philosophy: A Contemporary Reader introduces the core methods at the centre of analytic philosophy today. From armchair conceptual analysis and the role of scientific evidence, to the resurgence of interest in the nature of rational intuitions, it brings together the readings responsible for the recent explosion of methodological work in philosophy. This up-to-date and easy to navigate reader features influential texts from ten core topics including formal methods, argumentation, thought experiments and analytic feminism. Allowing students...
Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, it is widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day—cases in which agents forget information, or in which they assign degrees of belief to self-locating claims. Quitting Certainties argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability of Conditionalization (Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at an earlier time to less-than-certa...
We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, particularly when we are exposed to higher-order evidence. This book explains how disagreements with trusted friends, or learning of our own cognitive biases, can impact on our views. From there it explores a range of interrelated issues on this topic of higher-order evidence.
Herman Cappelen investigates how language and other representational devices can go wrong, and how to fix them. We use language to understand and talk about the world, but what if our language has deficiencies that prevent it from playing that role? How can we revise our concepts, and what are the limits on revision?