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This paper defines a set of banking stability measures which take account of distress dependence among the banks in a system, thereby providing a set of tools to analyze stability from complementary perspectives by allowing the measurement of (i) common distress of the banks in a system, (ii) distress between specific banks, and (iii) distress in the system associated with a specific bank. Our approach defines the banking system as a portfolio of banks and infers the system's multivariate density (BSMD) from which the proposed measures are estimated. The BSMD embeds the banks' default inter-dependence structure that captures linear and non-linear distress dependencies among the banks in the system, and its changes at different times of the economic cycle. The BSMD is recovered using the CIMDO-approach, a new approach that in the presence of restricted data, improves density specification without explicitly imposing parametric forms that, under restricted data sets, are difficult to model. Thus, the proposed measures can be constructed from a very limited set of publicly available data and can be provided for a wide range of both developing and developed countries.
Discover current uses and future development of stress tests, the most innovative regulatory tool to prevent and fight financial crises.
Macroprudential stress testing (MaPST) is becoming firmly embedded in the post-crisis policy-frameworks of financial-sectors around the world. MaPSTs can offer quantitative, forward-looking assessments of the resilience of financial systems as a whole, to particularly adverse shocks. Therefore, they are well suited to support the surveillance of macrofinancial vulnerabilities and to inform the use of macroprudential policy-instruments. This report summarizes the findings of a joint-research effort by MCM and the Systemic-Risk-Centre, which aimed at (i) presenting state-of-the-art approaches on MaPST, including modeling and implementation-challenges; (ii) providing a roadmap for future-research, and; (iii) discussing the potential uses of MaPST to support policy.
Written by leading academics and practitioners, this book provides an overview of financial markets and addresses major policy issues using the most advanced tools of theoretical and empirical economic analysis. In particular, the book focuses on financial integration and the structural reforms now taking place in the European financial sector.
This paper examines the financial stability implications arising from securitization markets, with one eye on the past and another on the future. The paper begins by deriving a number of “lessons learned” based on an examination of key industry developments in the years before the crisis. Emphasis is placed on the various ways in which securitization markets dramatically changed shape in the years preceding the crisis, vis-à-vis their earlier (simpler) incarnation. Current impediments to securitization markets are then discussed, including a treatment of various regulatory initiatives, the operational infrastructure of securitization markets, and related official sector intervention. Finally, a broad suite of policy recommendations is presented to address the factors that either contributed to the crisis or may currently be posing obstacles to growth-supportive, sustainable securitization markets. These proposals are guided by the objective of preserving the beneficial features of securitization, while mitigating those that pose a potential risk to financial stability.
We propose a framework to link empirical models of systemic risk to theoretical network/ general equilibrium models used to understand the channels of transmission of systemic risk. The theoretical model allows for systemic risk due to interbank counterparty risk, common asset exposures/fire sales, and a “Minsky" cycle of optimism. The empirical model uses stock market and CDS spreads data to estimate a multivariate density of equity returns and to compute the expected equity return for each bank, conditional on a bad macro-outcome. Theses “cross-sectional" moments are used to re-calibrate the theoretical model and estimate the importance of the Minsky cycle of optimism in driving systemic risk.
The recent global financial crisis has forced a re-examination of risk transmission in the financial sector and how it affects financial stability. Current macroprudential policy and surveillance (MPS) efforts are aimed establishing a regulatory framework that helps mitigate the risk from systemic linkages with a view towards enhancing the resilience of the financial sector. This paper presents a forward-looking framework ("Systemic CCA") to measure systemic solvency risk based on market-implied expected losses of financial institutions with practical applications for the financial sector risk management and the system-wide capital assessment in top-down stress testing. The suggested approach uses advanced contingent claims analysis (CCA) to generate aggregate estimates of the joint default risk of multiple institutions as a conditional tail expectation using multivariate extreme value theory (EVT). In addition, the framework also helps quantify the individual contributions to systemic risk and contingent liabilities of the financial sector during times of stress.
To mitigate systemic risk, some regulators have advocated the greater use of centralized counterparties (CCPs) to clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives trades. Regulators should be cognizant that large banks active in the OTC derivatives market do not hold collateral against all the positions in their trading book and the paper proves an estimate of this under-collateralization. Whatever collateral is held by banks is allowed to be rehypothecated (or re-used) to others. Since CCPs would require all positions to have collateral against them, off-loading a significant portion of OTC derivatives transactions to central counterparties (CCPs) would require large increases in posted collateral, possibly requiring large banks to raise more capital. These costs suggest that most large banks will be reluctant to offload their positions to CCPs, and the paper proposes an appropriate capital levy on remaining positions to encourage the transition.
Banks’ living wills involve both recovery and resolution. Since it may not always be clear when recovery plans or actions should be triggered, there is a role for an objective metric to trigger recovery. We outline how such a metric could be constructed meeting criteria of (i) adequate loss absorption; (ii) distinguishing between weak and sound banks; (iii) little susceptibility to manipulation; (iv) timeliness; (v) scalable from the individual bank to the system. We show how this would have worked in the U.K., during 2007–11. This approach has the added advantage that it could be extended to encompass a whole ladder of sanctions of increasing severity as capital erodes.
This book advances a real entity theory of company law. In this theory the company is a legal entity allowing an organization to act autonomously in law, and company law establishes procedures facilitating autonomous organizational decision-making. The theory builds on the insight that organizations or firms are a social phenomenon outside of the law and that they are autonomous actors in their own right. They are more than the sum of the contributions of their participants and they act independently of the views and interests of their participants. The real entity theory advanced in this book explains company law as it stands at a positive level. Companies are liable in tort and crime. The statute creates roles for shareholders, directors, a company secretary, and auditors and so facilitates a process leading to organizational action. The law also integrates the interests of creditors and stakeholders. The book states the law as of 1 August 2021.