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We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of their users. CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.
This paper analyzes whether structural changes in the aftermath of the pandemic have steepened the Phillips curves in advanced economies, reversing the flattening observed in recent decades and reducing the sacrifice ratio associated with disinflation. Particularly, analysis of granular price quote data from the UK indicates that increased digitalization may have raised price flexibility, while de-globalization may have made inflation more responsive to domestic economic conditions again. Using sectoral data from 24 advanced economies in Europe, higher digitalization and lower trade intensity are shown to be associated with steeper Phillips curves. Post-pandemic Phillips curve estimates indicate some steepening in the UK, Spain, Italy and the euro area as a whole, but at magnitudes that are too small to explain the entire surge in inflation in 2021–22, suggesting an important role for outward shifts in the Phillips curve.
Lenders can exploit households' payment data to infer their creditworthiness. When households value privacy, they then face a tradeoff between protecting such privacy and credit conditions. We study how the introduction of an informationally more intrusive digital payment vehicle affects households' cash use, credit access, and welfare. A tech monopolist controls the intrusiveness of the new payment method and manipulates information asymmetries among households and oligopolistic banks to extract data contracts that are more lucrative than lending on its own. The laissez-faire equilibrium entails a digital payment vehicle that is more intrusive than socially optimal, providing a rationale for regulation.
We estimate that the recent surge in international fossil fuel prices will raise European households’ cost of living in 2022 by close to 7 percent of consumption on average. Household burdens vary significantly across and within countries, but in most cases they are regressive. Policymakers have mostly responded to the shock with broad-based price-suppressing measures, including subsidies, tax reductions, and price controls. Going forward, the policy emphasis should shift rapidly towards allowing price signals to operate more freely and providing income relief to the vulnerable. The surge in energy prices will encourage energy conservation and investments in renewable energy, but the manyfold rise in natural gas prices could lead to a persistent switch towards coal. To ensure steady progress towards carbon emissions reduction goals, authorities could use the opportunity to strengthen carbon pricing when global fossil fuel prices decline in the future. Non-price incentives for investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy should also be enhanced, as envisaged in the RePowerEU plan.
The surge in energy prices due to Russia’s war in Ukraine inflicted a sharp terms of trade shock on the UK economy. While energy prices have since declined, the future energy price path remains uncertain, with futures-implied prices substantially above their levels prior to October 2021, when Russian natural gas imports to Europe began to be curtailed. In this context, section I analyzes the impact of the energy price shock on UK households and firms; section II describes the energy support measures introduced by the UK government; and section III provides staff’s assessment of these measures and sets out some options to optimize the policy response to a possible resurgence in energy prices. These include structural measures to ensure energy security and raise resilience to spikes in energy prices, and options to refine, especially the targeting of, support measures that could be introduced in response.
Ukraine’s economic performance has been anemic since the early 1990s. A major impediment to productivity growth has been low investment, held back by lack of strong and independent institutions. This paper aims to assess the major areas of institutional weakness in Ukraine and quantify the long-term growth impact of catching-up to Poland in terms of the quality of major economic institutions and market development. Our analysis identifies the legal system as the area where the institutional quality is weakest compared to Poland, followed distantly by market competition, openness to trade and financial depth. Using a methodology that accounts for positive spillovers between the structural reform areas, we estimate that even under the most optimistic scenario, where institutional gaps are fully addressed, Ukraine would need 15 years to catch up to Poland’s current income level.
This paper presents a new dataset on the dynamics of non-performing loans (NPLs) during 88 banking crises since 1990. The data show similarities across crises during NPL build-ups but less so during NPL resolutions. We find a close relationship between NPL problems—elevated and unresolved NPLs—and the severity of post-crisis recessions. A machine learning approach identifies a set of pre-crisis predictors of NPL problems related to weak macroeconomic, institutional, corporate, and banking sector conditions. Our findings suggest that reducing pre-crisis vulnerabilities and promptly addressing NPL problems during a crisis are important for post-crisis output recovery.
We test whether foreign demand matters for local house prices in the US using an identification strategy based on the existence of “home bias abroad” in international real estate markets. Following an extreme political crisis event abroad, a proxy for a strong and exogenous shift in foreign demand, we show that house prices rise disproportionately more in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of population originating from the crisis country. This effect is strong, persistent, and robust to the exclusion of major cities. We also show that areas that were already expensive in the late 1990s have experienced the strongest foreign demand shocks and the biggest drop in affordability between 2000 and 2017. Our findings suggest a non-trivial causal effect of foreign demand shocks on local house prices over the last 20 years, especially in neighbourhoods that were already rather unaffordable for the median household.
We present a model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. Depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2008 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector e...
Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a government's decision between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses distortionary taxation and whether to apply an optimal haircut to bondholders. We show that when the size of senior tranches is small, a version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds: tranching just redistributes government revenues from junior to senior bondholders, while taxes and government borrowing costs remain unchanged. However, as senior tranches become sufficiently large, default costs on senior debt transpire into a stronger commitment to repay not only the senior tranche, but also the junior one. We show that there is a lower threshold for senior bonds above which tranching can eliminate default on both junior and senior debt, and an upper threshold beyond which the government defaults also on senior debt.