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Three years after the COVID-19 crisis, employment and total hours worked in Europe fully recovered, but average hours per worker did not. We analyze the decline in average hours worked across European countries and find that (i) it is not cyclical but predominantly structural, extending a long-term trend that predates COVID-19, (ii) it mainly reflects reduced hours within worker groups, not a compositional shift towards lower-hours jobs and workers, (iii) men—particularly those with young children—and youth drive this drop, (iv) declines in actual hours match declines in desired hours. Policy reforms could help involuntary parttimers and women with young children raise their actual hours towards desired levels, but the aggregate impact on average hours would be limited to 0.5 to 1.5 percent. Overall, there is scant evidence of slack at the intensive margin in European labor markets, and the trend fall in average hours worked seems unlikely to reverse.
Using individual-level data for 30 European countries between 1983 and 2019, we document the extent and earning consequences of workers’ reallocation across occupations and industries and how these outcomes vary with individual-level characteristics, namely (i) education, (ii) gender, and (iii) age. We find that while young workers are more likely to experience earnings gains with on-the-job sectoral and occupational switches, low-skilled workers’ employment transitions are associated with an earnings loss. These differences in earnings gains and losses also mask a high degree of heterogeneity related to trends in routinization. We find that workers, particularly low-skilled and older workers during recessions, experience a severe earning penalty when switching occupations from non-routine to routine occupations.
How often have wage-price spirals occurred, and what has happened in their aftermath? We investigate this by creating a database of past wage-price spirals among a wide set of advanced economies going back to the 1960s. We define a wage-price spiral as an episode where at least three out of four consecutive quarters saw accelerating consumer prices and rising nominal wages. Perhaps surprisingly, only a small minority of such episodes were followed by sustained acceleration in wages and prices. Instead, inflation and nominal wage growth tended to stabilize, leaving real wage growth broadly unchanged. A decomposition of wage dynamics using a wage Phillips curve suggests that nominal wage growth normally stabilizes at levels that are consistent with observed inflation and labor market tightness. When focusing on episodes that mimic the recent pattern of falling real wages and tightening labor markets, declining inflation and nominal wage growth increases tended to follow – thus allowing real wages to catch up. We conclude that an acceleration of nominal wages should not necessarily be seen as a sign that a wage-price spiral is taking hold.
We document the importance of import prices and domestic profits as a counterpart to the recent increase in euro area inflation. Through a novel consumption deflator decomposition, we show that import prices account for 40 percent of the average change in the consumption deflator over 2022Q1 – 2023Q1, while domestic profits account for 45 percent. The increase in nominal profits was largest in sectors benefiting from increasing international commodity prices and those exposed to recent supply-demand mismatches. While the results show that firms have passed on more than the nominal cost shock, and have fared relatively better than workers, the limited available data does not point to a wide...
Early evidence on the pandemic’s effects pointed to women’s employment falling disproportionately, leading observers to call a “she-cession.” This paper documents the extent and persistence of this phenomenon in a quarterly sample of 38 advanced and emerging market economies. We show that there is a large degree of heterogeneity across countries, with over half to two-thirds exhibiting larger declines in women’s than men’s employment rates. These gender differences in COVID-19’s effects are typically short-lived, lasting only a quarter or two on average. We also show that she-cessions are strongly related to COVID-19’s impacts on gender shares in employment within sectors.
Output gap estimates are widely used to inform macroeconomic policy decisions, including in Korea. The main determinant of these estimates is the measure of labor market slack. The traditional measure of unemployment in Korea yields an incomplete estimate of labor market slack, given that many workers prefer involuntary part-time jobs or leaving the labor force rather than registering as unemployed. This paper discusses a way in which the measure of unemployment can be broadened to yield a more accurate measure of labor market slack. This broader measure is then used to estimate the output gap using a multivariate filter, yielding a more meaningful measure of the output gap.
Koreas cross border capital flows have tended to respond negatively in global risk-off episodes, resulting in volatility in the foreign exchange market and occasional policy responses in the form of foreign exchange interventions. We study the relationship between Korean capital flows and global volatility up to 2018. The response of capital flows during risk-off episodes have become more muted over time, and occasional safe-haven type flows into Korean bond markets have helped counterbalance the tendency for portfolio investors to leave. We describe these changing patterns and relate them to shifts in Korea’s domestic investor base. We discuss whether they reflect a sustained shift in the sensitivity of Koreas capital flow pressures to global risk-off episodes, and implications for monetary and exchange rate policies.
We evaluate the impact of fiscal reforms on growth and inequality in Cambodia using a calibrated general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents (Peralta-Alva et al., 2018). Over the last two decades, Cambodia’s consumption inequality and poverty have declined. However, income inequality is higher, and large gaps remain between urban and rural residents. At the same time, domestic revenue mobilization has improved substantially, but collection of tax revenue is biased towards non-progressive sources. We use the model to evaluate the growth and inequality impact of reforms that increase infrastructure spending by raising (i) VAT, (ii) property tax, or (iii) personal income tax. We find that using property taxes delivers the largest increase in GDP and reduction in inequality. Reaping the gains from property taxation will however require additional investments in tax administration.
Supply constraints hurt the economic recovery and boosted inflation in 2021. We find that in the euro area, manufacturing output and GDP would have been about 6 and 2 percent higher, respectively, and half of the rise in manufacturing producer price inflation would not have occurred in the absence of supply bottlenecks. Globally, shutdowns can explain up to 40 percent of the supply shocks. Sectors that are more reliant on differentiated inputs—such as autos—are harder hit. Late last year industry experts expected supply shortages for autos to largely dissipate by mid-2022 and broader bottlenecks by end-2022, but given the Omicron wave, disruptions will last for longer, possibly into 2023. With supply constraints adding to price pressures, the challenge for policymakers is to support recovery without allowing high inflation to become entrenched.
How did expectations of the outcome of the United Kingdom's (UK) referendum on European Union (EU) membership in 2016 affect prices in financial markets? We study this using high frequency data from betting and financial markets. We find that a one percentage point increase in the probability of "Leave" result caused British stocks (FTSE All-Share) to decline by 0.004 percent, and the Pound to depreciate by 0.006 percent against the euro. We find negative and significant effects for most sub-sectors, and negative spill-overs to other EU member countries. We show that the differential impact across sectors and countries can be explained by differences in the trade exposures.