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This is an excerpt of From Great Depression to Great Depression: The Elusive Quest for International Policy Cooperation.
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
We develop an open economy New Keynesian Model with foreign exchange intervention in the presence of a financial accelerator mechanism. We obtain closed-form solutions for the optimal interest rate policy and FX intervention under discretionary policy, in the face of shocks to risk appetite in international capital markets. The solution shows that FX intervention can help reduce the volatility of the economy and mitigate the welfare losses associated with such shocks. We also show that, when the financial accelerator is strong, the risk of multiple equilibria (self-fulfilling currency and inflation movements) is high. We determine the conditions under which indeterminacy can occur and highlight how the use of FX intervention reinforces the central bank’s credibility and limits the risk of multiple equilibria.
This paper uses a disequilibrium framework to investigate a possible credit crunch in the East Asian crisis countries (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand) during 1997-98. It defines a credit crunch as a situation in which interest rates do not equilibrate supply and demand for credit and the aggregate amount is supply constrained, i.e. there is quantity rationing. In all three countries, rising real interest rates and weakening economic activity lowered credit demand and (with the exception of Indonesia in late 1997) there is little evidence of quantity rationing at the aggregate level—although individual firms may have lost access to credit.
Why have emerging market economies (EMEs) been stockpiling international reserves? We find that motives have varied over time?vulnerability to current account shocks was relatively important in the 1980s but, as EMEs have become more financially integrated, factors related to the magnitude of potential capital outflows have gained in importance. Reserve accumulation as a by-product of undervalued currencies has also become more important since the Asian crisis. Correspondingly, using quantile regressions, we find that the reason for holding reserves varies according to the country's position in the global reserves distribution. High reserve holders, who tend to be more financially integrated, are motivated by insurance against capital account rather than current account shocks, and are more sensitive to the cost of holding reserves than are low-reserve holders. Currency undervaluation is a significant determinant across the reserves distribution, albeit for different reasons.
The global financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession raised concerns about adjustment fatigue, deflation, currency wars, and secular stagnation that presented a sense of déjà vu: similar concerns had arisen at the time of the Great Depression and at the end of World War II. As with earlier crises, these concerns prompted calls for greater international policy cooperation—both to achieve a sustainable recovery from the crisis and to prevent future crises. This volume compiles papers from a 2015 symposium of eminent scholars convened by the IMF to discuss how history can inform current debates about the functioning and challenges of the international monetary system. An introductory...
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
Governments issue debt for good and bad reasons. While the good reasons—intertemporal tax-smoothing, fiscal stimulus, and asset management—can explain some of the increases in public debt in recent years, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. Bad reasons for borrowing are driven by political failures associated with intergenerational transfers, strategic manipulation, and common pool problems. These political failures are a major cause of overborrowing though budgetary institutions and fiscal rules can play a role in mitigating governments’ tendencies to overborrow. While it is difficult to establish a clear causal link from high public debt to low output growth, it is likely that some countries pay a price—in terms of lower growth and greater output volatility—for excessive debt accumulation.
This paper examines why surges in capital flows to emerging market economies (EMEs) occur, and what determines the allocation of capital across countries during such surge episodes. We use two different methodologies to identify surges in EMEs over 1980-2009, differentiating between those mainly caused by changes in the country's external liabilities (reflecting the investment decisions of foreigners), and those caused by changes in its assets (reflecting the decisions of residents). Global factors-including US interest rates and risk aversion¡-are key to determining whether a surge will occur, but domestic factors such as the country's external financing needs (as implied by an intertemporal optimizing model of the current account) and structural characteristics also matter, which explains why not all EMEs experience surges. Conditional on a surge occurring, moreover, the magnitude of the capital inflow depends largely on domestic factors including the country's external financing needs, and the exchange rate regime. Finally, while similar factors explain asset- and liability-driven surges, the latter are more sensitive to global factors and contagion.
What considerations should guide public debt policy going forward? Should debt be reduced to achieve normative anchors (such as 60 percent of GDP), should it be increased further to finance a big public investment push, or should the existing debt be serviced forever? We argue that, for countries with ample fiscal space (little risk of encountering a fiscal crisis), raising distortive taxes merely to bring the debt down is a treatment cure that is worse than the disease. High public debt of course is costly, but it is a sunk cost only made worse by efforts to pay down the debt through distortionary taxation. Living with the debt is the welfare-maximizing policy. In decisions vis-à-vis the big push for public investment, golden-rule considerations remain salient, with due account taken of the additional servicing costs (and associated distortive taxation) from the resulting buildup of public debt.