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In this stimulating volume, which was originally published in 1955, Professor Norman A. Graebner argues that historians have exaggerated the role played by the spirit of manifest destiny in the expansionism of the 1840s. In his view, neither the overland migrations nor eastern public opinion had any direct bearing on the diplomacy that won Oregon and California for the United States. Instead, the principal objective of every statesman from Jackson on was maritime: the acquisition of the harbors at San Diego, San Francisco, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca as gateways to the trade of the Orient. “Land was necessary to them merely as a right of way to ocean ports—a barrier to be spanned by improved avenues of commerce.” This diplomacy reached a climax under Polk and triumphed with the Trist mission and the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, giving America “its empire on the Pacific.” It is upon this premise that Professor Graebner has built a reinterpretation of the diplomacy of the 1840s. An invaluable addition to any American History library.
WHY THE SOUTH LOST What led to the downfall of the Confederacy? The distinguished professors of history represented in this volume examine the following crucial factors in the South’s defeat: ECONOMIC—RICHARD N. CURRENT of the University of Wisconsin attributes the victory of the North to fundamental economic superiority so great that the civilian resources of the South were dissipated under the conditions of war. MILITARY—T. HARRY WILLIAMS of Louisiana State University cites the deficiencies of Confederate strategy and military leadership, evaluating the influence on both sides of Baron Jomini, a 19th-century strategist who stressed position warfare and a rapid tactical offensive. DIP...
This work is a contemporary chronicle of the Cold War and offers an analysis of policy and rhetoric of the United States and Soviet Union during the 1980s. The authors examine the assumptions that drove political decisions and the rhetoric that defined the relationship as the Soviet Union began to implode. This work demonstrates that while the subsequent unraveling of the Soviet empire was an unintended side effect of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, termination of the Cold War was not. Ronald Reagan deserves full credit for recognizing Gorbachev's sincerity and his determination to change the direction of Soviet policies. For this, Reagan felt the full wrath of anticommunist hawks for doing bus...
This study, a realist interpretation of the long diplomatic record that produced the coming of World War II in 1939, is a critique of the Paris Peace Conference and reflects the judgment shared by many who left the Conference in 1919 in disgust amid predictions of future war. The critique is a rejection of the idea of collective security, which Woodrow Wilson and many others believed was a panacea, but which was also condemned as early as 1915. This book delivers a powerful lesson in treaty-making and rejects the supposition that treaties, once made, are unchangeable, whatever their faults.
This collection of essays presented at a conference at West Point by leading political thinkers, including David Alan Rosenberg, Richard D. Challener, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Martin J. Sherwin, explores the national security policies developed by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (1945-1960) in response to the threat of Soviet expansionism. Stressing that fear motivated the makers of Cold War policy, the contributors discuss such topics as the objections raised by Democrats to nuclear security strategy, Eisenhower's disputes with Army and Navy leaders, and the evolution of Cold War policy into today's global security policy.
This concise diplomatic history of the Confederation era is the first new work on the topic in a generation. In its pages, three distinguished diplomatic historians offer a realist interpretation of the way in which the Founding Fathers conducted foreign affairs, refreshing our collective memory about their priorities and their values. When three of the nation's leading historians come together to fashion a fresh study of American history, the resulting work cannot help but be a monumental addition to the field. Foreign Affairs and the Founding Fathers: From Confederation to Constitution, 1776–1787 is such a work. These eminent scholars provide a thoughtful, realist interpretation of the F...
Before this book first appeared in 1963, most historians wrote as if the continental expansion of the United States were inevitable. "What is most impressive," Henry Steele Commager and Richard Morris declared in 1956, "is the ease, the simplicity, and seeming inevitability of the whole process." The notion of inevitability, however, is perhaps only a secular variation on the theme of the expansionist editor John L. O'Sullivan, who in 1845 coined one of the most famous phrases in American history when he wrote of "our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions." Frederick Merk rejected inevitability in favor of a more contingent interpretation of American expansionism in the 1840s. As his student Henry May later recalled, Merk "loved to get the facts straight." --From the Foreword by John Mack Faragher
Featuring a new fifty-page interview with Hans J. Morgenthau by Bernard Johnson, this volume on the renowed scholar and philosopher demonstrates how pervasive is his mark on the study of international relations and political philosophy. The interview illuminates Morgenthau's intellectual development in Europe between the world wars and in the United States. It is in recognition of his unsurpassed contribution to the field of international relations and political philosophy that this collection of contributions from distinguished scholars has been assembled. The continuation and refinement of his work in this book prove the lasting value of his philosophical truths in the understanding of human nature, the role of power at all levels of society, and his concept of national interest.