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"The EU made a strong commitment to developing an effective EU led crisis management capacity. By 2003 the EU must be in a position to deploy within 60 days up to 50,000-60,000 troops capable of a full range of so-called Petersberg tasks including: humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, combat force tasks in crisis management and peacemaking missions." "According to the EU however the initiative should not be seen as a duplication of NATO. Neither should the establishment of a European Force be confused with the concept of a European army. Whether a European army, or a common defence for Europe is more capable of handling the future needs and challenges of the EU is not the subject of this book. Essentially it is about whether a military crisis management system is practical and realistic and how the planned initiatives within the agreed limits are to be transformed into operative policy."--BOOK JACKET.
As France begins to confront the new challenges of the post-Cold War era, the time has come to examine how French security policy has evolved since Charles de Gaulle set it on an independent course in the 1960s. Philip Gordon shows that the Gaullist model, contrary to widely held beliefs, has lived on--but that its inherent inconsistencies have grown more acute with increasing European unification, the diminishing American military role in Europe, and related strains on French military budgets. The question today is whether the Gaullist legacy will enable a strong and confident France to play a full role in Europe's new security arrangements or whether France, because of its will to independence, is destined to play an isolated, national role. Gordon analyzes military doctrines, strategies, and budgets from the 1960s to the 1990s, and also the evolution of French policy from the early debates about NATO and the European Community to the Persian Gulf War. He reveals how and why Gaullist ideas have for so long influenced French security policy and examines possible new directions for France in an increasingly united but potentially unstable Europe.
Exploring signals and systems, this work develops continuous-time and discrete-time concepts, highlighting the differences and similarities. Two chapters deal with the Laplace transform and the Z-transform. Basic methods such as filtering, communication an
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An ideology is sweeping Europe and the world which threatens democracy and the rule of law. The post-national ideology, which posits that nation-states are no longer capable of running their own affairs in a modern, interdependent economy, confuses the constitution of a state with the power of its government, and ignores the importance of the sense of community essential to any democratic debate. A rigorous synthesis of historical and philosophical arguments, THE TAINTED SOURCE is a powerful appeal in favour of the constitutional foundations of the liberal order. Post-national structures - multinational companies, 'region-states' and supranational organisations such as the European Union - are corrosive of liberal values, to such an extent that John Laughland makes it devastatingly clear that the post-national ideology formed a crucial core of Nazi economic and political thinking. Like the European ideology of today, it was predicted on dissolving the nation-state and the liberal order.
This selected and annotated bibliography of source materials on the Maghreb deals with over 500 books and articles on this fascinating region. The volume will prove to be an indispensable reference tool to researrchers, scholars, business people and general readers.
As Rynning shows, armed forces have a natural interest in shaping military doctrine according to their resources, doctrinal traditions, as well as their assessment of the international environment. However, armed forces are also the instrument of policy-makers who are in charge of national security. Using civil-military relations in France from 1958 to the present as a case study, he shows when policy-makers are capable of controlling military doctrine as well as the means armed forces rely on to influence doctrine. Some scholars argue that policy-makers can control military doctrine only when the international environment is threatening--a situation granting them added decision-making authority. Others argue that such control ultimately depends on the degree of domestic political disagreement/consensus. With access to most of the leading military personnel and policy-makers of the era, Rynning provides an analysis that will be instructive to scholars as well as policy-makers and military leaders concerned with contemporary civil-military relations.