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Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
Ignorance and Moral Responsibility
Michael J. Zimmerman investigates the relation between ignorance and moral responsibility. He begins with the presentation of a case in which a tragedy occurs, one to which many people have unwittingly contributed, and addresses the question of whether their ignorance absolves them of blame for what happened. Inspection of the case issues in the Argument from Ignorance, whose conclusion is that, to be blameworthy for one's behaviour and its consequences, one must at some time in the history of that behaviour have known that one was engaged in wrongdoing-a thesis that threatens to undermine many everyday ascriptions of responsibility. This argument is examined and refined in ensuing chapters ...
Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy
This edited collection focuses on the moral and social dimensions of ignorance—an undertheorized category in analytic philosophy. Contributors address such issues as the relation between ignorance and deception, ignorance as a moral excuse, ignorance as a legal excuse, and the relation between ignorance and moral character. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse; some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character; and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Ignorance has certain social dimensions as well: it has been claimed to be the engine of science; it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy; and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. Together, these contributions provide a sustained inquiry into the nature of ignorance and the pivotal role it plays in the moral and social domains.
Hanson
Originally West Parish in Pembroke, the town of Hanson is a small community rich in history and character. It was incorporated as Hanson in 1820 with nine hundred seventeen town members and has continued to grow while remaining a small town at heart. Hanson, known for its many beautiful brooks and ponds, has been a popular place for recreation throughout the history of Massachusetts. Hanson will introduce you to Hanson's noteworthy sites, such as the Plymouth County Hospital and the summer resort "the Needles." It features some of Hanson's most famous citizens, including Albert Burrage, a Boston businessman who was responsible for Burrage Industries and the Needles; Ephraim Albert Gorham, who began the movement to convert wetlands to cranberry bogs; and Marcus Urann, who organized and ran what became the Ocean Spray Cranberry Company. This collection will help locals and visitors enjoy the history of Hanson for generations.
A Companion to Free Will
Provides a comprehensive, cutting-edge, and accessible accompaniment to various narratives about free will A Companion to Free Will is an indispensable resource for anyone interested in the philosophy of free will, offering an authoritative survey of perennial issues and contemporary debates within the field. Bringing together the work of a diverse team of established and younger scholars, this well-balanced volume offers innovative perspectives and fresh approaches to the classical compatibility problem, moral and legal responsibility, consciousness in free action, action theory, determinism, logical fatalism, impossibilism, and much more. The Companion’s 30 chapters provide general cover...
Risk and Responsibility in Context
This volume bridges contemporary philosophical conceptions of risk and responsibility and offers an extensive examination of the topic. It shows that risk and responsibility combine in ways that give rise to new philosophical questions and problems. Philosophical interest in the relationship between risk and responsibility continues to rise, due in no small part due to environmental crises, emerging technologies, legal developments, and new medical advances. Despite such interest, scholars are just now working out how to conceive of the links between risk and responsibility, the implications that risks may have to conceptions of responsibility (and vice versa), as well as how such theorizing...
Responsibility
Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
The Vital Birth Records of Nashua, New Hampshire, 1887-1935
This information was taken from the published City of Nashua, New Hampshire Annual Reports. There were many births at home during this period that were not registered in the year of birth but were later reported to the city clerk. These late recordings were never recorded in subsequent annual reports. (To find out about these births one would have to make a request to the Nashua city clerk.) The births are recorded as follows: last name, first name, date of birth, gender, birth number of child in family, father's name and place of birth, mother's name and place of birth. Finally, colored or stillborn children are so designated at the end of the entry. The information is presented in an easy-to-use alphabetical format.
A Wild West of the Mind
The book addresses two main topics-first, the morality of thought and, second, what's involved in having a free mind. It connects these topics by arguing that to have a free mind, a person must be willing to follow his thoughts wherever they lead, and that this just isn't possible if the person thinks that some thoughts are morally off limits. The book defends the unpopular position that it is not morally wrong to have even the nastiest of attitudes, the most biased of beliefs, or the vilest of fantasies.
Full Responsibility
Starting with an appreciation of the practical realizations that move us to assume responsibility, Full Responsibility develops an ontologically-grounded model of different forms of responsibility and the challenges and fulfillments found in each. Special attention is given to pragmatic and political responsibility, highlighting considerations for right action that are not accurately recognized by universalizing ethics. Issues in abortion decisions, providing for responsible work, and immigration and refugee policy are examined in the complex frame of political responsibility. Moving past the standoff between political moralism and political realism, Steven G. Smith offers an account of political responsibility as an unstable combination of all modes of responsibility. The book concludes by reviewing different approaches to the impossible but compelling ideal of full responsibility. The distinctive natures of ethical, historical, and religious forms of responsibility are discussed in appendices.
