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This volume commemorates the centenary of Logical Investigations by subjecting the work to a comprehensive critical analysis. It contains new contributions by leading scholars addressing some of the most central analyses to be found in the book.
Edmund Husserl occupied himself with the analysis of time-consciousness throughout his life. In this book, the three stages that may be distinguished in Husserl's occupation with this theme are discussed in their interrelationship. The first stage consists of a lecture manuscript from 1905; the second stage consists of the so-called Bernau manuscripts, research manuscripts that were written in 1917 and 1918; and the final stage consists of the so-called C-manuscripts, research manuscripts that were written in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. Central themes in the discussion of Husserl's phenomenology of time in this book are: the connection between the analysis of time-consciousness and the analysis of phantasy-consciousness and image-consciousness; Husserl's position in the debate between A. Meinong and W. Stern concerning the possibility of the perception of time; the self-constitution of absolute time-consciousness; the influence of Husserl's development of genetic phenomenology on his analysis of time-consciousness; and the question of the intentional character of time-consciousness.
How is society possible? In Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaflen und die transzendentale Phiinomenoiogie, I Edmund Husserl is found with a pathos send ing out pleas for belief ("Glauben") in his transcendental philosophy and tran scendental ego. The traditional idea of theoretical reflection instituted in ancient Greece as the suspension of all taken for granted worldly interests has, through a partial realization of itself, forsaken itself in the one-sided development of the objective mathematical-natural sciences as they themselves have become so taken for granted, with the method and validity of their results held as so self-evident, that they appear as resting self-sufficiently on...
At the origin of this volume, a simple question: what to make of that surprisingly monotonous series of statements produced by our societies and our philosophers that all converge in one theme - the importance of difference? To clarify the meaning of the difference at stake here, we have tried to rephrase it in terms of the two major and mutually competing paradigms provided by the history of phenomenology only to find both of them equally unable to accommodate this difference without violence. Neither the ethical nor the ontological approach can account for a subject that insists on playing a part of its own rather than following the script provided for it by either Being or the Good. What ...
" . . . die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt. ,,1 he aim of Twentieth century phenomenology is to provide a non T psychologistic interpretation of subjectivity. Husserl agrees with Frege; to adopt psychologism is to give up truth. But this should not prevent us from investigating the subjective perspective. On the contrary, Husserl thinks that an appropriate rejection of psychologism must be able to show how propositions are correlated to and grounded in subjective intuitions without thereby reducing them to psychological phenomena. Obviously this calls for an interpretation of subjectivity that makes a sharp distinction between the subjective perspective and the psychological realm. Phenome...
The guiding dictum of phenomenology is "to the things themselves. " This saying conveys a sense that the "things," the "phenomena" with which we are confronted and into which we seek some insight are not as immediately accessible as may be imagined. Phenomena, however, are often hidden not by their distance from us, but by their very proximity, by the fact that they are taken for granted as being self-evident and understood by all. Even the most common, everyday phenomena and the words used to describe them often reveal, upon closer inspection, a degree of complexity which had previously been unsuspected. Upon interrogation, that which had been taken to be self-evident and widely understood ...
What is "scientific" about the natural and human sciences? Precisely this: the legibility of our worlds and the distinctive reading strategies that they provoke. That account of the essence of science comes from Edith Stein, who as HusserI's assistant 1916-1918 labored in vain to bring his massive Ideen to publication, and then went on to propose her own solution to the problem of finding a unified foundation for the social and physical sciences. Stein argued that human bodily life itself affords direct access to the interplay of natural causality, cultural motivation, and personal initiative in history and technology. She developed this line of approach to the sciences in her early scholarly publications, which too soon were overshadowed by her religious lectures and writings, and eventually were obscured by National Socialism's ideological attack on philosophies of empathy. Today, as her church prepares to declare Stein a saint, her secular philosophical achievements deserve another look.
To understand the role of time within the scope of 20th century ontology, after the fundamental works of E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, P. Ricoeur, and E. Levinas, means to develop simultaneously the ontology of time. My aim is to demonstrate that in a definite sense the postmodern onto-logy is chrono-logy. The argument proceeds (and this constitutes its essential novelty) within the `multidimensional space' involving not only the synchronic stratum of current conceptuality in its internal logical relationships, but also the diachronic axis of conceptual genesis. I apply different strategies of analysis in order to emphasize that the concept of the human Self, the concept of being, and the concept of time are inseparably linked with one another. To this triad I add one more link of a theological nature, viz. the relationship between God and the human mind as it has been developed in Orthodox apophatic theology and during the Scholastic controversies concerning the problem of visio Dei.
Kant's Critique of Judgment accounts for the sharing of a common world, experienced affectively, by a diverse human plurality. In order to appreciate Kant's project, Judging Appearances retrieves the connection between appearance and judgment in the Critique of Judgment. Kleist emphasizes the important but neglected idea of a sensus communis, which provides the indeterminate criterion for judgments regarding appearance. Judging Appearances examines the themes of appearance and judgment against the background of Kant's debt to Leibniz and Shaftesbury. Drawing upon treatments by Husserl, Sartre, Ricoeur and Arendt, Kleist delineates the proto-phenomenological method through which Kant uncovers the idea of a sensus communis. Kleist shows that taste is a discipline of opening oneself to appearance, requiring a subject who dwells in a common world of appearances among a diverse human plurality. This volume will prove valuable for anyone interested in a fresh approach to themes at the heart of Kant's aesthetics.
What follows attempts to synthesize Husserl's social ethics and to integrate the themes of this topic into his larger philosophical concerns. Chapter I proceeds with the hypothesis that Husser! believed that all of life could be examined and lived by the transcendental phenomenologist, and therefore action was not something which one did isolated from one's commitment to being philosophical within the noetic-noematic field. Therefore besides attempting to be clear about the meaning of the reduction it relates the reduction to ethical life. Chapter II shows that the agent, properly understood, i. e. , the person, is a moral theme, indeed, reflection on the person involves an ethical reduction...