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This is the long-awaited third edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. This edition has been comprehensively revised and updated to reflect the profound changes in corporate law and governance practices that have taken place since the previous edition. These include numerous regulatory changes following the financial crisis of 2007-09 and the changing landscape of governance, especially in the US, with the ever more central role of institutional investors as (active) owners of corporations. The geographic scope of the coverage has been broadened to include an important emerging economy, Brazil. In addition, the book now incorporates analysis of the burgeoning u...
Buy anew versionof this Connected Casebook and receiveaccessto theonline e-book, practice questionsfrom your favorite study aids, and anoutline toolon CasebookConnect, the all in one learning solution for law school students. CasebookConnect offers you what you need most to be successful in your law school classes - portability, meaningful feedback, and greater efficiency.This looseleaf version of the Connected Casebook does not come with a binder. The extraordinary authorship of William A. Allen and Reinier Kraakman provides a unique real-world perspective to Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization. Logical and flexible organization allows for chapters to be taught in any...
This is the long-awaited second edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. This edition has been comprehensively updated to reflect profound changes in corporate law. It now includes consideration of additional matters such as the highly topical issue of enforcement in corporate law, and explores the continued convergence of corporate law across jurisdictions. The authors start from the premise that corporate (or company) law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems: (1) the opportunism of managers vis-à-vis shareholders; (2) the opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders; and (3) the opportunism of shareho...
This overview starts from the premise that corporate law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems - the opportunism of: managers vis-a-vis shareholders; controlling shareholders vis-a-vis minority shareholders; and shareholdersvis-a-vis other corporate constituencies.
From the authors of Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization, this comprehensive yet concise Statutory Supplement provides relevant excerpts from state and federal statutes, SEC rules and regulations, restatements and model codes, and comparable provisions from non-U.S. jurisdictions. An indispensable reference, the 2009-2010 Statutory Supplement will complement any casebook for Corporations or Business Organizations. Including timely developments and all of the essential sources: The Restatement (Second) of Agency The Restatement (Third) of Agency The Restatement (Second) of Trusts The Uniform Partnership Acts The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act The Delawa...
The most comprehensive and interdisciplinary anthology of corporate law material available, this reader reflects the enormous changes that have occurred in business organization and legal scholarship since the hostile takeover was introduced in the 1980s. The second edition has both completely revised and expanded the material covered in the first edition. New and revised topics include capital markets, agency theory, behavioral economics, state competition for corporate charters, boards of directors, shareholder voting rights, executive compensation, activist investors, takeovers, securities regulation and comparative corporate governance.
Takes readers through an in-depth examination of many leading industrialized nations and identifies both the drivers that propel corporations towards convergence and the major impediments that stand in the way of convergence. Also examines many mechanisms of convergence such as governance codes, MNCs, and IPOs.
Corporate governance is on the reform agenda all over the world. How will global economic integration affect the different systems of corporate ownership and governance? Is the Anglo-American model of shareholder capitalism destined to become the template for a converging global corporate governance standard or will the differences persist? This reader contains classic work from leading scholars addressing this question as well as several new essays. In a sophisticated political economy analysis that is also attuned to the legal framework, the authors bring to bear efficiency arguments, politics, institutional economics, international relations, industrial organization, and property rights. These questions have become even more important in light of the post-Enron corporate governance crisis in the United States and the European Union's repeated efforts at corporate integration. This will become a key text for postgraduates and academics.
On the one hand, it can be argued that the increasing economic and political interdependence of countries has led to the convergence of national legal systems. On the other hand, advocates of the counterhypothesis maintain that this development is both unrealistic and unnecessary. Mathias M. Siems examines the company law of the UK, the USA, Germany, France, Japan and China to see how this issue affects shareholder law. The author subsequently analyses economic and political factors which may or may not lead to convergence, and assesses the extent of this development. Convergence of Shareholder Law not only provides a thorough comparative legal analysis but also shows how company law interconnects with political forces and economic development and helps in evaluating whether harmonisation and shareholder protection should be enhanced.
Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.