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This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.
As with the previous editions, this fourth edition relies on teaching by example and the Karplus Learning Cycle to convey the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibrium are systematically introduced in the first half of the book. Bayesian Nash equilibrium is briefly introduced. The subsequent chapters discuss cooperative solutions with and without side payments, rationalizable strategies and correlated equilibria, and applications to elections, social mechanism design, and larger-scale games. New examples include panic buying, supply-chain shifts in the pandemic, and global warming.
Although it was an important specialization in economics in the mid-twentieth century, welfare economics has received less attention in the twenty-first century. This book explores the history of welfare economics, with a view to explaining its rise and subsequent decline. Drawing on both philosophy and economics, this book offers a new and original perspective on the history of welfare economics, starting with Pigou and charting the trajectory of applied and theoretical welfare economics throughout the twentieth century. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of philosophy, economics and history of economic thought.
The objectives of this book are twofold. Firstly, it proposes that economics should be defined as a study of imperfect cooperation. Secondly, it elucidates the continuities that extend from classical political economy through the neoclassical, Keynesia
This book serves as an introduction to game theory for students with no prior game theory knowledge, or with limited background in economics and mathematics. It is specifically designed to provide an intuitive and accessible interdisciplinary approach to game theory, while simultaneously exploring cooperative games, repeated play, correlated equilibrium, and a range of applications. The Instructor Manual is available upon request for all instructors who adopt this book as a course text. Please send your request to sales@wspc.com.
This volume revisits the history of welfare economics, showing that economists have regularly drawn on ethical values for practical issues.
The second edition of this widely acclaimed and extensively cited collection of original contributions by specialist authors reflects changes in the field of cultural economics over the last eight years. Thoroughly revised chapters alongside new topics and contributors bring the Handbook up-to-date, taking into account new research, literature and the impact of new technologies in the creative industries. The book covers a range of topics encompassing the creative industries as well as the economics of the arts and culture, and includes chapters on: economics of art (including auctions, markets, prices, anthropology), artists' labour markets, creativity and the creative economy, cultural districts, cultural value, globalization and international trade, the internet, media economics, museums, non-profit organisations, opera, performance indicators, performing arts, publishing, regulation, tax expenditures, and welfare economics.
Artificial economics is a computational approach that aims to explain economic systems by modeling them as societies of intelligent software agents. The individual agents make autonomous decisions, but their actual behaviors are constrained by available resources, other individuals' behaviors, and institutions. Intelligent software agents have communicative skills that enable simulation of negotiation, trade, reputation, and other forms of knowledge transfer that are at the basis of economic life. Incorporated learning mechanisms may adapt the agents' behaviors. In artificial economics, all system behavior is generated from the individual agents' simulated decisions; no system level laws are a priori imposed. For instance, price convergence and market clearing may emerge, but not necessarily. Thus, artificial economics facilitates the study of the mechanisms that make the economy function. This book presents a selection of peer-reviewed papers addressing recent developments in this field between economics and computer science.
Game theory is useful in understanding collective human activity as the outcome of interactive decisions. In recent years it has become a more prominent aspect of research and applications in public policy disciplines such as economics, philosophy, management and political science, and in work within public policy itself. Here Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory with the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring potential solutions in public policy. In practice, the influence of game theory on public policy and related disciplines has been less a consequence of broad theorems than of insightful examples. Accordingly, the author offers a critical review of major topics from both cooperative and noncooperative game theory, including less-known ideas in noncooperative game theory and constructive proposals for new approaches. In so doing, he provides a toolkit for the analysis of public policy as well as a clearer understanding of the public policy enterprise itself. The author s unique approach and treatment of game theory will be a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves.
This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.