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Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke's account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Her interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. By taking seriously Locke's general approach to questions of identity, Boeker shows that we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, she argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains ...
The Self: A History explores the ways in which the concept of an 'I' or a 'self' has been developed and deployed at different times in the history of Western Philosophy. It also offers a striking contrast case, the 'interconnected' self, who appears in some expressions of African Philosophy. The I or self seems engulfed in paradoxes. We are selves and we seem to be conscious of ourselves, yet it is very difficult to say what a self is. Although we refer to ourselves, when we try to find or locate ourselves, the I seems elusive. We can find human bodies, but we do not refer to ourselves by referring to our bodies: we do not know that we are raising our hands or thinking hard by looking at our arms or catching a glimpse of our furrowed brows in a mirror. The essays in this volume engage many philosophical resources--metaphysics, epistemology, phenomenology, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of language--to try to shed needed light on these puzzles.
Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness runs through and helps to solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology and in his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. Central to her account is that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states wherein consciousness is a constituent. Such an interpretation answers charges of inconsistency in Locke's model of the mind and lends coherence to a puzzling aspect of Locke's theory of knowledge: how we know individual things (particular ideas, ourselves, and external objects) when knowledge is defined as the perception of an agreeme...
Adam Smith’s contribution to economics is well recognised, yet scholars have recently been exploring anew the multidisciplinary nature of his works. The Adam Smith Review is a rigorously refereed annual review that provides a unique forum for interdisciplinary debate on all aspects of Adam Smith’s works, his place in history and the significance of his writings to the modern world. It is aimed at facilitating debate among scholars working across the humanities and social sciences, thus emulating the reach of the Enlightenment world which Smith helped to shape. This 13th volume demonstrates, perhaps more so than any other issue in recent memory, the dazzling breadth and diversity of Smith scholarship across the disciplines today – from studies of hospitals, balls and monsters to colonies, clerisy, language and the mind; from issues of empathy, compassion, cohesion, translation, representation, paternalism and moral innovation, to Smith’s influence on Japanese, Portuguese, Chinese, American and Italian thought and practice. Adam Smith remains our companion, always provoking us and stimulating creative directions in our thinking and research.
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke’s critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke’s use of the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
This volume collects 19 of the author’s essays on eighteenth-century accounts of self-consciousness, personal identity and related issues, covering over a hundred years of a philosophical debate that has shaped the way in which these topics are discussed today. After a detailed analysis of the seventeenth-century background, the essays analyze and critically evaluate French, British and German contributions, ranging from Claude Buffier early in the century to Kant and aspects of the Post-Kantian debate. The essays deal with a large number of diverse sources, including the views and arguments of well-known philosophers such as Hume and Kant, as well as lesser-known thinkers, such as LeLarge...
This book brings together a team of international scholars to attempt to understand David Hume’s conception of the self. The standard interpretation is that he holds a no-self view: we are just bundles of conscious experiences, thoughts and emotions. There is nothing deeper to us, no core, no essence, no soul. In the Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, though, Hume admits to being dissatisfied with such an account and Part One of this book explores why this might be so. Part Two turns to Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise, where Hume moves away from the ‘fiction’ of a simple self, to the complex idea we have of our flesh and blood selves, those with emotional lives, practical goals, and social relations with others. In Part Three connections are traced between Hume and Madhyamaka Buddhism, Husserl and the phenomenological tradition, and contemporary cognitive science.
This book takes the reader on a philosophical quest to understand the dark side of emotions. The chapters are devoted to the analysis of negative emotions and are organized in a historical manner, spanning the period from ancient Greece to the present time. Each chapter addresses analytical questions about specific emotions generally considered to be unfavorable and classified as negative. The general aim of the volume is to describe the polymorphous and context-sensitive nature of negative emotions as well as changes in the ways people have interpreted these emotions across different epochs. The editors speak of ‘the dark side of the emotions’ because their goal is to capture the ambiva...
This book considers different forms of voluntarism developed from the thirteenth to eighteenth centuries. By crossing the conventional dividing line between the medieval and early modern periods, the volume draws important new insights on the historical development of voluntarism. Voluntarism places a special emphasis on the will when it comes to the analysis and explanation of fundamental philosophical questions and problems. Since the Middle Ages, voluntarist considerations and views played an important role in the development of different theories of action, ethics, metaethics, and metaphysics. The chapters in this volume are grouped according to three distinct kinds of voluntarism: psych...
This book considers the conscious subject, the subject of experience, in particular the human subject-the self, the person. Galen Strawson examines the phenomenology of the self-he asks what is it like to have or be a self or to feel that one is or has a self-and the metaphysics of the self-Is there really such a thing as the self? If so, what is its nature? He develops a novel approach to the metaphysical questions out of the results of the phenomenological investigation, and argues, against those who say that the self is just the human being, that we can legitimately distinguish self and human being. At the same time he raises doubts about how long selves can be supposed to last, insofar a...