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A selection of Kent's recently declassified writings on the occasion of the Conference on Estimating Soviet Military Power, 1950-1984, which Harvard University's Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History and the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence are co-sponsoring in Cambridge in December, 1994.
The classic book that established the principles and methods of modern intelligence analysis With the outbreak of the Second World War, historian Sherman Kent left his classroom at Yale to join the Office of Strategic Services—the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency—where he adapted scholarly methods to the rigors and unique challenges of producing actionable intelligence in support of the war effort. In this remarkable book, Kent draws on the lessons he learned in wartime to lay the foundations for postwar security. He presents the doctrine and practices of intelligence analysis and explains why they are vital to national survival. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy shows how intelligence activities and their consequences extend far beyond military considerations and are as essential to keeping the peace as they are to winning the war.
These collected essays by Sherman Kent were edited by Donald P. Steury and published in 1994 by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C. Kent was chairman of the Board of National Estimates from 1952 - 1967 and these declassified essays represent the essence of his thinking on estimate preparation as well as important historical background on the methodology used before and during his tenure. The foreword is by J. Kenneth McDonald, then (1994) chief of the CIA History Staff and the text includes some security-related redactions. This book, long out of print, is a foundational text in the study of intelligence analysis. For the general non-fiction reading public, Kent's illustrative anecdotes about De Gaulle, Bedell Smith, Dean Acheson, etc., offer color and interest, as does his "lessons learned" essay on analysis failure in predicting Soviet missile deliveries to Cuba.
Kent examines the structure of Restoration elections and the politics of the later Bourbon monarchy: why King Charles X and Prime Minister de Villele called the 1827 general election; reasons for their defeat; election of a chamber of deputies to sustain the reactionary leanings of the king; and efforts of both left and extreme right opposition.
Intelligence work is in some ways like a newspaper or newsmagazine, in some like a business, in some like the research activity of a university; very little of it involves cloaks and daggers. All of it is important to national survival, and should be understood by the citizens of a democracy. In this remarkable book, an able scholar, experienced in foreign intelligence, analyzes all of these varied aspects of what is known as "high-level foreign positive intelligence." Illustrations are drawn from that branch, but the lessons apply to all intelligence, and in fact to all those phases of business, of journalism, and (most importantly) of scholarship, where the problem is to learn what has hap...
Recounts the adventures of three boys during the summer they spend working on a Nevada ranch in the 1920's.
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Drawing on the individual and collective experience of recognized intelligence experts and scholars in the field, Analyzing Intelligence provides the first comprehensive assessment of the state of intelligence analysis since 9/11. Its in-depth and balanced evaluation of more than fifty years of U.S. analysis includes a critique of why it has under-performed at times. It provides insights regarding the enduring obstacles as well as new challenges of analysis in the post-9/11 world, and suggests innovative ideas for improved analytical methods, training, and structured approaches. The book's six sections present a coherent plan for improving analysis. Early chapters examine how intelligence an...
In this seminal work, published by the C.I.A. itself, produced by Intelligence veteran Richards Heuer discusses three pivotal points. First, human minds are ill-equipped ("poorly wired") to cope effectively with both inherent and induced uncertainty. Second, increased knowledge of our inherent biases tends to be of little assistance to the analyst. And lastly, tools and techniques that apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex problems.