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The Politics of Property Rights
This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1876-1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.
Fragile by Design
Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.
The Battle Over Patents
This essay is the introduction to a book of the same title, forthcoming in summer of 2021 from Oxford University Press. The purpose is to document the ways in which patent systems are products of battles over the economic surplus from innovation. The features of these systems take shape as interests at different points in the production chain seek advantage in any way they can, and consequently, they are riven with imperfections. The interesting historical question is why US-style patent systems with all their imperfections have come to dominate other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The essays in the book suggest that the creation of a tradable but temporary property right facilitates the transfer of technological knowledge and thus fosters a highly productive decentralized ecology of inventors and firms.
Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America
Crony capitalism systems—in which those close to political policymakers receive favors allowing them to earn returns far above market value—are a fundamental feature of the economies of Latin America. Haber and his expert contributors draw from case studies in Mexico, Brazil, and other countries around the world to examine the causes and consequences of cronyism.
Political Institutions and Financial Development
The essays in this volume employ the insights and techniques of political science, economics and history to provide a fresh answer to this question.
How Latin America Fell Behind
In 1800, the per capita income of the United States was twice that of Mexico and roughly the same as Brazil's. By 1913, it was four times greater than Mexico's and seven times greater than Brazil's. This volume seeks to explain the nineteenth-century lag in Latin American economic development. Breaking with the longstanding dependency tradition in Latin American historiography, the contributors argue that the slowdown had far more to do with internal political and legal structures than foreign influences. Topics covered include the performance of Mexico and Brazil, the impact of independence, capital markets, regional growth, the impact of railroads, and the economic effects of 'culture'. The editor's introductory essay surveys the history of economic growth theories and Latin American economic historiography. -- Publisher's description.
Industry and Underdevelopment
The recent economic troubles of Mexico should have surprised no one, for the Mexican economy is an unhealthy one whose basic problems extend back to the nineteenth century - that is the major theme of this study of the formative years of industrialization in Mexico. The author focuses on the forces - economic, political, and technological - that have thwarted Mexican efforts to become a competitive member of the international economic community. Unlike most previous studies, which have relied on aggregate data published by the Mexican government that lump together all industries and all firms, this study is based almost entirely on new material concerning individual companies and individual ...
Economic Development in the Americas Since 1500
Examines differences in the rates of economic growth in Latin America and mainland North America since the seventeenth century.
Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America
Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America offers a new contribution to the literature on institutions and growth through the analysis of historical cases of institutional change and economic growth in Latin America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Mexico Since 1980
This book addresses two questions that are crucial to understanding Mexico's current economic and political challenges. Why did the opening up of the economy to foreign trade and investment not result in sustained economic growth? Why has electoral democracy not produced rule of law? The answer to those questions lies in the ways in which Mexico's long history with authoritarian government shaped its judicial, taxation, and property rights institutions. These institutions, the authors argue, cannot be reformed with the stroke of a pen. Moreover, they represent powerful constraints on the ability of the Mexican government to fund welfare-enhancing reforms, on the ability of firms and households to write contracts, and on the ability of citizens to enforce their basic rights.
