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Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? New Empirical Evidence from Europe
This paper studies how fiscal rules interact with the intergovernmental fiscal framework to foster fiscal discipline among European subnational governments. We use political variables describing the fiscal attitudes of the central government as instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of subnational fiscal rules on fiscal balances. The results suggest that the discipline-enhancing effect of fiscal rules is weaker when there are large “vertical fiscal imbalances” that is, large differences in revenue and spending assignments across the different levels of government. These findings imply that separate reforms to reduce excessive vertical fiscal imbalances complement a rules-based fiscal framework that is aimed at fostering fiscal discipline.
How to Select Fiscal Rules
This note provides guidance on how to select fiscal rules in a wide range of economies, including advanced, emerging market, and developing economies. The principles and methods discussed are intuitive and easy to implement, and leave room for policy judgment. The methods are based on past academic and IMF work, including analytic and policy papers, technical assistance missions, and training. The note is structured as follows. The first section lays out general principles regarding the design of fiscal rules. The second section reviews the most common rules and describes their pros and cons. The third section presents the various types of analytical tools used to select fiscal rules (some f...
Second-Generation Fiscal Rules
Fiscal rule frameworks have evolved significantly in response to the global financial crisis. Many countries have reformed their fiscal rules or introduced new ones with a view to enhancing the credibility of fiscal policy and providing a medium-term anchor. Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have also been upgraded. However, these innovations have made the systems of rules more complicated to operate, while compliance has not improved. The SDN takes stock of past experiences, reviews recent reforms, and presents new research on the effectiveness of rules. It also proposes guiding principles for future reforms to strike a better balance between simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Read the blog
Independent Fiscal Councils: Recent Trends and Performance
Countries increasingly rely on independent fiscal councils to constrain policymakers’ discretion and curb the bias towards excessive deficits and pro-cyclical policies. Since fiscal councils are often recent and heterogeneous across countries, assessing their impact is challenging. Using the latest (2016) vintage of the IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, we focus on two tasks expected to strengthen fiscal performance: the preparation or assessment of forecasts, and the monitoring of compliance with fiscal rules. Tentative econometric evidence suggests that the presence of a fiscal council is associated with more accurate and less optimistic fiscal forecasts, as well as greater compliance with fiscal rules.
On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance
This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible.
Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income Countries
This paper presents, for the first time, multi-dimensional indices of the quality of budget institutions in low-income countries. The indices allow for benchmarking against the performance of middle-income countries, across regions, and according to different institutional arrangements that deliver good fiscal performance. Using the constructed indices, the paper provides preliminary empirical support for the hypotheses that strong budget institutions help improve fiscal balances and public external debt outcomes; and countries with stronger fiscal institutions have better scope to conduct countercyclical policies.
On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance
This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible.
Cyclical Patterns of Government Expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa
This paper documents cyclical patterns of government expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa since 1970 and explains variation between countries and over time. Controlling for endogeneity, it finds government expenditures to be slightly more procyclical in sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing countries and some evidence that procyclicality in Africa has declined in recent years after a period of sharp increase through the 1990s. Greater fiscal space, proxied by lower external debt, and better access to concessional financing, proxied by larger aid flows, seem to be important factors in diminishing procyclicality in the region. The role of institutions is less clear cut: changes in political institutions have no impact on procyclicality.
Mozambique Rising: Building a New Tomorrow
The countries in the East African Community (EAC) are among the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa. This report highlights Mozambique’s remarkably strong growth over the two decades since the end of the civil war in 1992, as well as the major challenges that remain for the country to rise out of poverty and further its economic development.
The Great Divide: Regional Inequality and Fiscal Policy
Growing regional inequality within countries has raised the perception that “some places and people” are left behind. This has prompted a shift toward inward-looking policies and away from pro-growth reforms. This paper presents novel stylized facts on regional inequality for OECD countries. It shows that regional disparity in per-capita GDP is large (even after adjusting for regional price differences), persistent, and widening over time. The paper also finds that rising nationwide income inequality is associated with both rising within-region income inequality and widening average income across regions. The rise in inequality is related to declining incentives for interregional labor mobility, especially for poor households in lagging regions, which are estimated to reduce by as much as one-third in the United States. Against these facts, the paper proposes a framework to identify whether, how and by whom fiscal policies can be used to tackle regional inequality. It outlines conditions under which those policies should be spatially-targeted and illustrates how they can be complementary to conventional means-testing methods in mitigating income inequality.
