You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents. The audience for game theory has grown dramatically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professional interest in game theory is likely to require. Such a text would minimize notation, ruthlessly focus on essentials, and yet not sacrifice rigor. This Synthesis Lecture aims to fill this gap by providing a concise and accessible introduction to the field. It covers the main classes of games, their representations, and the main concepts used to analyze them.
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
The annual Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS) conference is the flagship meeting on neural computation and machine learning. This volume contains the papers presented at the December 2006 meeting, held in Vancouver.
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the 8th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2005, held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in September 2005. The 29 revised full papers and 2 keynote papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The papers address many current topics in multi-agent research and development, ranging from theoretical and methodological issues to various applications in different fields.
A Symposium was held on February 25, 2006 in honor of the 80th birthday of Saul I. Gass and his major contributions to the field of operations research over 50 years. This volume includes articles from each of the Symposium speakers plus 16 other articles from friends, colleagues, and former students. Each contributor offers a forward-looking perspective on the future development of the field.
This textbook connects three vibrant areas at the interface between economics and computer science: algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division. It thus offers an interdisciplinary treatment of collective decision making from an economic and computational perspective. Part I introduces to algorithmic game theory, focusing on both noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Part II introduces to computational social choice, focusing on both preference aggregation (voting) and judgment aggregation. Part III introduces to fair division, focusing on the division of both a single divisible resource ("cake-cutting") and multiple indivisible and unshareable resources ("multiagent resource allocation"). In all these parts, much weight is given to the algorithmic and complexity-theoretic aspects of problems arising in these areas, and the interconnections between the three parts are of central interest.
Stringently reviewed papers presented at the October 1992 meeting held in Cambridge, Mass., address such topics as nonmonotonic logic; taxonomic logic; specialized algorithms for temporal, spatial, and numerical reasoning; and knowledge representation issues in planning, diagnosis, and natural langu
How can organizations ensure that they can get best value for money in their procurement decisions? How can they stimulate innovations from their dedicated suppliers? With contributions from leading academics and professionals, this 2006 handbook offers expert guidance on the fundamental aspects of successful procurement design and management in firms, public administrations, and international institutions. The issues addressed include the management of dynamic procurement; the handling of procurement risk; the architecture of purchasing systems; the structure of incentives in procurement contracts; methods to increase suppliers' participation in procurement contests and e-procurement platforms; how to minimize the risk of collusion and of corruption; pricing and reputation mechanisms in e-procurement platforms; and how procurement can enhance innovation. Inspired by frontier research, it provides practical recommendations to managers, engineers and lawyers engaged in private and public procurement design.
In Japan there are robots that guide customers through marketplaces advising them where to find the product matching their needs, and realistic replicas of university professors allow them to teach their lectures a hundred kilometers away from the classroom. Not to speak about intelligent prostheses and remote high-precision surgery.
Computational pool is a relatively recent entrant into the group of games played by computer agents. It features a novel combination of properties that distinguish it from other such games, including continuous action and state spaces, uncertainty in execution, a unique turn-taking structure, and of course an adversarial nature. This combination leads to new challenges, both in modeling and reasoning about the game and in designing agents for effective play. We address the modeling challenges by presenting a model of generalized billiards games and showing that an equilibrium exists within this model. To address the practical challenges of designing an agent, we discuss CueCard, our agent wh...