You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
The Mismeasure of the Self is dedicated to vices that blight many lives. They are the vices of superiority, characteristic of those who feel entitled, superior and who have an inflated opinion of themselves, and those of inferiority, typical of those who are riddled with self-doubt and feel inferior. Arrogance, narcissism, haughtiness, and vanity are among the first group. Self-abasement, fatalism, servility, and timidity exemplify the second. This book shows these traits to be to vices of self-evaluation and describes their pervasive harmful effects in some detail. Even though the influence of these traits extends to any aspect of life, the focus of this book is their damaging impact on the life of the intellect. Tanesini develops and defends a view of these vices that puts vicious motivations at their core. The analyses developed in this work build on empirical research in attitude psychology and on philosophical theories in virtue ethics and epistemology. The book concludes with a positive proposal for weakening vice and promoting virtue.
Although their positions and arguments differ in several respects, feminists have asserted that science, knowledge, and rationality cannot be severed from their social, political, and cultural aspects.
Some of the most problematic human behaviors involve vices of the mind such as arrogance, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, gullibility, and intellectual cowardice, as well as wishful or conspiratorial thinking. What sorts of things are epistemic vices? How do we detect and mitigate them? How and why do these vices prevent us from acquiring knowledge, and what is their role in sustaining patterns of ignorance? What is their relation to implicit or unconscious bias? How do epistemic vices and systems of social oppression relate to one another? Do we unwittingly absorb such traits from the process of socialization and communities around us? Are epistemic vices traits for which we can blamed? Can t...
Polarisation, intransigence and dogmatism in political and moral debate have in recent years threatened to overwhelm many Western-style democracies, where for centuries reasoned argument has been a hallmark feature of tackling disagreement. For many people, this marks a worrying deterioration in the moral and political climate, threatening to create a divisive environment of "us" versus "them". In this superb collection a team of international contributors examine these pressing issues from a philosophical perspective. Topics explored include: the problem of "deep disagreements"; martial conceptions of argumentation and the motivation to argue to win; epistemic egocentrism; intellectual trust; bullshit and dogmatism; intellectual humility and the internet; epistemic and "tribal" arrogance and authoritarianism; empathy and polarisation; and epistemic rights violations. Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives will be of great interest to researchers in political philosophy, applied and social epistemology, ethics and feminist philosophy, as well as those working in politics and sociology.
Feminist thinkers have been critically examining science for over a century; but who critiques the criticism?
Quassim Cassam introduces the idea of epistemic vices, character traits that get in the way of knowledge, such as closed-mindedness, intellectual arrogance, wishful thinking, and prejudice. Using examples from politics to illustrate the vices at work, he considers whether we are responsible for such failings, and what we can do about them.
Other Logics: Alternatives to Formal Logic in the History of Thought and Contemporary Philosophy challenges the widespread idea of formal logic as inherently monolithic, universal, and ahistorical. Written by both leading and up-and-coming scholars, and edited by Admir Skodo, Other Logics offers a wide variety of historical and philosophical alternatives to this idea, all arguing that logic is a historical, concrete, and multi-dimensional phenomenon. To name a few examples, Frank Ankersmit lays down a representationalist logic, Alessandra Tanesini forcefully argues for the possibility of logical aliens, Christopher Watkin analyzes how leading contemporary French philosophers view the idea of logic, and Aaron Wendland unearths Heidegger's critique of formal logic. In Other Logics readers will find provocative interventions in a highly contested field in contemporary philosophy. Contributors include: Frank Ankersmit, Christopher Watkin, Giuseppina D'Oro, Alessandra Tanesini, Admir Skodo, Aaron Wendland, Ervik Cejvan, Anders Kraal, Christopher Fear, Karim Dharamsi, Johan Modée, and Thord Svensson.
Edited by an international team of leading scholars, The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology is the first major reference work devoted to this growing field. The Handbook’s 46 chapters, all appearing in print here for the first time, and written by philosophers and social theorists from around the world, are organized into eight main parts: Historical Backgrounds The Epistemology of Testimony Disagreement, Diversity, and Relativism Science and Social Epistemology The Epistemology of Groups Feminist Epistemology The Epistemology of Democracy Further Horizons for Social Epistemology With lists of references after each chapter and a comprehensive index, this volume will prove to be the definitive guide to the burgeoning interdisciplinary field of social epistemology.
Humility is a vital aspect of political discussion, social media and self-help, whilst recent empirical research has linked humility to improved well-being, open-mindedness and increased accuracy in assessing persuasive messages. It is also a topic central to research and discussion in philosophy, applied ethics and religious studies. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility is the first collection to present a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of humility, whilst also covering important interdisciplinary topics. Comprising 41 chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook is divided into seven parts: • Theories of humility • The ethics of humility • The politics of humility • Humility in religious thought • The epistemology of humility • The psychology of humility • Humility: applications to the social world. Essential reading for students and researchers in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy and philosophy of mind and psychology, this Handbook will also be extremely useful for those in related disciplines such as psychology, religious studies and law.
Undoubtedly, emotions sometimes thwart our epistemic endeavours. But do they also contribute to epistemic success? The thesis that emotions 'skew the epistemic landscape', as Peter Goldie puts it in this volume, has long been discussed in epistemology. Recently, however, philosophers have called for a systematic reassessment of the epistemic relevance of emotions. The resulting debate at the interface between epistemology, theory of emotions and cognitive science examines emotions in a wide range of functions. These include motivating inquiry, establishing relevance, as well as providing access to facts, beliefs and non-propositional aspects of knowledge. This volume is the first collection focusing on the claim that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes and evaluations related to empirical knowledge. All essays are specifically written for this collection by leading researchers in this relatively new and developing field, bringing together work from backgrounds such as pragmatism and scepticism, cognitive theories of emotions and cognitive science, Cartesian epistemology and virtue epistemology.