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This volume traces the historical roots and evolution of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in modern Asia. Focusing on armed rebellions and use of armed forces by both Western powers and indigenous states from the nineteenth century till present day, the volume unravels the problematic of change–continuity and addresses key questions on the nature of warfare. The book looks at eight different regions of Asia: US counter-insurgencies in Philippines; the British initiative in Indonesia and independent Indonesia’s counter-insurgency against its domestic populace; post-World War II Malaya; French and US war in Vietnam; British and Indian counter-insurgencies in North-East India between t...
Operation Hump, the first major battle between the U.S. Army and the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces, took place November 5-9, 1965, in South Vietnam's War Zone D. Known as "The Hump," it would change the nature of the war, escalating it from a hit-and-run guerrilla conflict to a bloody contest between Communist main force units and American commands of battalion size or larger. This memoir of an Operation Hump survivor begins with the sequence of events leading up to the battle, from the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Drawing on official Army documents and the recollections of fellow combatants, the author not only describes the battle in detail but explains the war's basis in fabrications at the highest levels of the U.S. government. His experiences with PTSD after the war and his eventual return to Vietnam in the 1990s are included.
The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.
This volume provides an account of how Army logistics affected ground operations during the Grenada intervention and how combat influenced logistical performance.--[from Foreword]
From the prewar development of the German war machine to the ultimate victory of the Allied coalition, here is an in-depth analysis of the battles that raged on the Western and Eastern Fronts. It examines the major strategies, the innovative tactics, and the new generation of weapons--along with the people who used them.
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
"When appropriate, the U.S. Air Force needs to be prepared to supply joint task force (JTF) headquarters. If the U.S. Air Force takes the steps necessary to produce JTF-capable units, both the service and the nation would benefit. The authors consider the nature of JTF command, survey command-related developments in other services and in other elements of the defense community, and examine four JTF operations. They raise issues for the Air Force to consider and offer a set of recommendations aimed at enhancing the Air Force's ability to staff and run JTF headquarters."--Provided by publisher.
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