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David Hume’s philosophical work presents the reader with a perplexing mix of constructive accounts of empirically guided belief and destructive sceptical arguments against all belief. This book reconciles this conflict by showing that Hume intended his scepticism to be remedial. It immunizes us against the influence of “unphilosophical” causes of belief, determining us to proportion our beliefs to the evidence. In making this case, this book develops Humean positions on topics Hume did not discuss in detail but that are of interest to contemporary philosophers: consciousness and the unity of consciousness, temporal experience, visual spatial perception, the experience of colour and oth...
Kant’s Inferentialism draws on a wide range of sources to present a reading of Kant’s theory of mental representation as a direct response to the challenges issued by Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature. Kant rejects the conclusions that Hume draws on the grounds that these are predicated on Hume’s theory of mental representation, which Kant refutes by presenting objections to Hume’s treatment of representations of complex states of affairs and the nature of judgment. In its place, Kant combines an account of concepts as rules of inference with a detailed account of perception and of the self as the locus of conceptual norms to form a complete theory of human experience as an essentia...
Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main varieties of nominalism about properties and provides tools to understand how they developed in the history of Western Philosophy. All essays are new and are written by experts on the topic, and they advance the discussion about nominalism to a new level.
This book examines the influence of Hume, Reid, Smith, Hutcheson, and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers on Kant’s philosophy. It begins with the influence of these thinkers on Kant, then moves to an examination of the relationship between truth, freedom, and responsibility and its connection to Kant’s metaphysics and aesthetics.
This volume offers a fresh exploration of the parts–whole relations within a power and among powers. While the metaphysics of powers has been extensively examined in the literature, powers have yet to be studied from the perspective of their mereology. Powers are often assumed to be atomic, and yet what they can do—and what can happen to them—is complex. But if powers are simple, how can they have complex manifestations? Can powers have parts? According to which rules of composition do powers compose into powers? Given the centrality of powers in current scientific as well as philosophical thought, recognizing and understanding the ontological differences between atomic and mereologically complex powers is important, for both philosophy and science. The first part of this book explores how powers divide; the second part, how powers compose. The final part showcases some specific study cases in the domains of quantum mechanics and psychology. Powers, Parts and Wholes will be of interest to professional philosophers and graduate students working in metaphysics, philosophy of science and logic.
The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a view on which things are organized into layers, with phenomena in higher layers dependent on and determined by what goes on below. Philosophers have recently explored the idea that we can make sense of this view by appeal to a relation called grounding. In Fundamental Things, Louis de Rosset develops the rudiments of a theory of grounding and applies that theory to questions concerning the contents of the layers and the relations among them. This theory specifies what grounding is and how it relates to relevant forms of explanation. It addresses arguments for skepticism about grounding and draws points of contrast between a gr...
In this volume--the first, focused study of Hume on time and identity--Baxter focuses on Hume’s treatment of the concept of numerical identity, which is central to Hume's famous discussions of the external world and personal identity. Hume raises a long unappreciated, and still unresolved, difficulty with the concept of identity: how to represent something as "a medium betwixt unity and number." Superficial resemblance to Frege’s famous puzzle has kept the difficulty in the shadows. Hume’s way of addressing it makes sense only in the context of his unorthodox theory of time. Baxter shows the defensibility of that theory against past dismissive interpretations, especially of Hume’s stance on infinite divisibility. Later the author shows how the difficulty underlies Hume’s later worries about his theory of personal identity, in a new reading motivated by Hume’s important appeals to consciousness. Baxter casts Hume throughout as an acute metaphysician, and reconciles this side of Hume with his overarching Pyrrhonian skepticism.
This new study of David Hume s philosophy of mathematics critically examines his objections to the concept of infinity, and his alternative phenomenalist theory of space and time as constituted by minima sensibilia or sensible extensionless indivisibles.
Putting Properties First considers the metaphysics of natural science. It develops and defends a contemporary metaphysical theory of natural modality called 'Modal Platonism', which puts properties first in the metaphysical hierarchy. According to this theory, natural properties-such as mass and charge-are fundamental entities which ground the laws of nature and the behavioural dispositions of physical things. This theory differs from other 'properties-first' approaches in two main ways. First, it views properties as Platonic universals, which exist even if they are not instantiated by anything. Second, the theory rejects the popular idea that properties are identical with, or essentially dependent upon, dispositions. Instead, Modal Platonism views properties as qualities which necessarily ground dispositions and other modal phenomena. This theory solves a range of philosophical puzzles regarding dispositions and laws. Given that laws of nature are a necessary precondition for scientific enquiry, Modal Platonism promises to provide a plausible metaphysical framework for all natural science.
David Kellogg Lewis (1941-2001) was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. He made significant contributions to almost every area of analytic philosophy including metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science, and set the agenda for various debates in these areas which carry on to this day. In several respects he remains a contemporary figure, yet enough time has now passed for historians of philosophy to begin to study his place in twentieth century thought. His philosophy was constructed and refined not just through his published writing, but also crucially through his life-long correspondence with fellow philosophers, includ...