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The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is the premier public resource on scientific and technological developments that impact global security. Founded by Manhattan Project Scientists, the Bulletin's iconic "Doomsday Clock" stimulates solutions for a safer world.
First Published in 1997. In an effort to find the validity of middle ground, this book offers a comprehensive analysis that looks further than the House Committee on National Security's actions on the B-2 bomber, President Clinton's campaign promise to support the Seawolf submarine, and the Pentagon's use of a concurrent and risky management strategy for the $71.6 billion F-22 fighter aircraft program. It provides a dissection of the decision-making process for a representative sample of major weapons systems to invalidate the claims that pork and malfeasance are both pervasive and determinate.
From Iraq to Bosnia to North Korea, the first question in American foreign policy debates is increasingly: Can air power alone do the job? Robert A. Pape provides a systematic answer. Analyzing the results of over thirty air campaigns, including a detailed reconstruction of the Gulf War, he argues that the key to success is attacking the enemy's military strategy, not its economy, people, or leaders. Coercive air power can succeed, but not as cheaply as air enthusiasts would like to believe.Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as well as those of Israel versus Egypt, providing details of bombing and governmental decision making. His detailed narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing range from the classical cases of World War II to an extraordinary reconstruction of airpower use in the Gulf War, based on recently declassified documents. In this now-classic work of the theory and practice of airpower and its political effects, Robert A. Pape helps military strategists and policy makers judge the purpose of various air strategies, and helps general readers understand the policy debates.
This 1954 biography traces the life of the famous English natural philosopher Thomas Young.
The proceedings of the first major scholarly conference on the OSS, which was in existence from 1941 through 1945. Includes 24 papers presented by veterans and historians of the OSS. Offers new insights into the activities and importance of the U.S.'s first modern national intelligence agency. Discusses: the U.S. on the brink of war; the operations of the OSS at the headquarters level and in the field throughout Western Europe, the Balkans, and Asia. Also explores the legacy of the OSS. Contributors include: Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., William Colby, Walt W. Rostow, Robin Winks, and Aline, Countess of Romanones.
Flying Blind offers an astute analysis of the role of organizational forces in initiating and shaping weapons programs. Michael E. Brown concerns himself with how weapons programs begin and why they turn out as they do. In the process he redresses a large imbalance in our understanding of how nations arm themselves. In an unmatched account constructed from massive archival work and material declassified through the Freedom of Information Act, the author provides a detailed description of all fifteen postwar U.S. strategic bomber programs, from the B-35 to the B-2. Challenging the conventional wisdom about arms races and the weapons acquisition process, Brown marshals compelling evidence that...