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This collection is a major contribution to the understanding and evaluation of Ernest Sosa’s profound and wide-ranging philosophy, in epistemology and beyond. A balanced, fair and critical volume, it offers a sensitive appreciation of his wide philosophical purview, a nuanced assessment of the detail of his thought, and a spur to exploring the linkages between the varied topics explored by the subtle mind of this great American scholar. The papers explore a wealth of Sosa’s academic interests, including his work on philosophical method, the philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and value theory, in addition to his output on epistemology itself. It offers, for example, a rebuttal ...
This is the first book devoted to the work of Ernest Sosa, one of the most influential contemporary epistemologists. Part of the acclaimed Philosophers and Their Critics series. The editor’s introduction serves as an introduction to Sosa’s epistemology. Contains critical essays by more than twenty of the most prominent epistemologists in the world, commenting on Sosa's work. Concludes with Sosa’s own reply to his critics.
First Published in 1997. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Ernest Sosa collects essays, written over the last 25 years, on the scope and nature of human knowledge.
Ernest Sosa extends his distinctive approach to epistemology, intertwining issues concerning the role of the will in judgment and belief with issues of epistemic evaluation. While noting that human knowledge trades on distinctive psychological capacities, Sosa also emphasises the role of the social in human knowledge.
Reflective Knowledge draws together ground-breaking work in epistemology by Ernest Sosa. He argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on virtuous circularity, shows how this idea may be found explicitly or just below the surface in such illustrious predecessors as Descartes and Moore, and defends the view against its rivals.
This volume presents the six John Locke lectures delivered by the author in Oxford in May and June of 2005.
Ernest Sosa extends his distinctive approach to epistemology, intertwining issues concerning the role of the will in judgment and belief with issues of epistemic evaluation. Questions about skepticism and the nature of knowledge are at the forefront. The answers defended are new in their explicit and sustained focus on judgment and epistemic agency. While noting that human knowledge trades on distinctive psychological capacities, Sosa also emphasizes the role of the social in human knowledge. Basic animal knowledge is supplemented by a level of reflective knowledge focused on judgment, and a level of 'knowing full well' that is distinctive of the animal that is rational.
A major figure in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, Ernest Sosa is a pioneer of contemporary virtue epistemology. Engaging with his important work for the first time, a team of renowned scholars of Chinese philosophy bring Western analytic epistemology into dialogue with themes and issues in the history of the Chinese tradition in order to reveal multiple points of connection. Drawing on thinkers and texts from Confucianism, Daoism, and Chinese Buddhism, chapters explore issues central to virtue epistemology, such as the reliabilist and responsibilist divide, the distinction between virtues constitutive of knowledge and virtues auxiliary to knowledge, epistemic competence, and the role of testimony. Including Sosa's constructive and systematic responses to each scholar's interpretation of his work, this volume demonstrates the value of cross-cultural dialogue, advancing the field of virtue epistemology, and paving the way for further engagement between philosophical traditions.
Epistemic Explanations develops an improved virtue epistemology and uses it to explain several epistemic phenomena. Part I lays out a telic virtue epistemology that accommodates varieties of knowledge and understanding particularly pertinent to the humanities. Part II develops an epistemology of suspension of judgment, by relating it to degrees of confidence and to inquiry. Part III develops a substantially improved telic virtue epistemology by appeal to default assumptions important in domains of human performance generally, and in our intellectual lives as a special case. This reconfigures earlier virtue epistemology, which now seems a first approximation. This part also introduces a metaphysical hierarchy of epistemic categories and defends in particular a category of secure knowledge.