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The papers in this volume explore various issues relating to theories of individual and collective choice, and theories of social welfare. The topics include individual and collective rationality, motivation and intention in economics, coercion, public goods, climate change, and voting theory. The book offers an excellent overview over latest research in these fields.
In this book, Binder shows that at the heart of the most prominent arguments in favour of value-neutral approaches to overall freedom lies the value freedom has for human agency and development. Far from leading to the adoption of a value-neutral approach, however, ascribing importance to freedom’s agency value requires one to adopt a refined value-based approach. Binder employs an axiomatic framework in order to develop such an approach. She shows that a focus on freedom’s agency value has far reaching consequences for existing results in the freedom ranking literature: it requires one to move beyond a person’s given all-things-considered preferences to the values underlying a person’s preference formation. Furthermore, it requires, as Binder argues, one to account (only) for those differences between choice options which really matter to people. Binder illustrates the implications of her analysis for the evaluation of public policy and human development with the capability approach: only if sufficient importance is ascribed to freedom’s agency value can the capability approach keep its promises.
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
In order to understand the various strands of general equilibrium theory, why it has taken the forms that it has since the time of Léon Walras, and to appreciate fully a view of the state of general equilibrium theorising, it is essential to understand Walras's work and examine its influence. The first section of this book accordingly examines the foundations of Walras's work. These include his philosophical and methodological approach to economic modelling, his views on human nature, and the basic components of his general equilibrium models. The second section examines how the influence of his ideas has been manifested in the theorising of his successors, surveying the models of theorists such as H. L. Moore, Vilfredo Pareto, Knut Wicksell, Gustav Cassel, Abraham Wald, John von Neumann, J. R. Hicks, Kenneth Arrow, and Gerard Debreu. The treatment also examines models of many types in which Walras's influence is explicitly acknowledged.
'To non-economists, it is hard to understand why economists spend so much effort on the competitive model whereas the world seems to be replete with large and powerful economic actors. In this respect, Jean Gabszewicz is atypical: he has spent most of his research time working on imperfectly competitive markets. However, instead of restricting himself to partial equilibrium analyses, he has tackled from the outset the problem of imperfect competition in a system of interrelated markets with the aim of studying how market power is spread throughout the whole system. This is one of the most challenging and fascinating tasks that economists face. But this is also a very hard one, and may explai...
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