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The 1990s saw global flows of foreign direct investment increase some sevenfold, spurring economists to explore FDI from a micro- or trade-based perspective. Foreign Direct Investment is one of the first books to analyze the macroeconomics of FDI, treating FDI as a unique form of international capital flow between specific pairs of countries. By examining the determinants of the aggregate flows of FDI at the bilateral, source-host-country level, Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka present the first systematic global analysis of the singular features of FDI flows. Drawing on a wealth of fresh data, they provide new theoretical models and empirical techniques that illuminate the vital country-pair characteristics that drive these flows. Uniquely, Foreign Direct Investment examines FDI between developed and developing countries, and not just between developed countries. Among many other insights, the book shows that tax competition vis-à-vis FDI need not lead to a "race to the bottom." Foreign Direct Investment is an essential resource for graduate students, academics, and policy professionals.
Should Banks Stress Test Results be Disclosed? An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits reviews the theoretical literature on disclosure, tying it to the recent policy debate on whether stress-test results should be disclosed. The authors review the nature of stress tests required by the Dodd-Frank act and conducted by the Federal Reserve, an important aspect of which is the public disclosure of the results. Then, it compares the arguments for and against the disclosure of banks stress test results. While the rationale for disclosing stress test results may seem intuitive in the wake of the financial crisis, some argue that disclosing these results may actually have negative unintended conseque...
Discover current uses and future development of stress tests, the most innovative regulatory tool to prevent and fight financial crises.
Originally written for a conference of the Federal Reserve, Gary Gorton's "The Panic of 2007" garnered enormous attention and is considered by many to be the most convincing take on the recent economic meltdown. Now, in Slapped by the Invisible Hand, Gorton builds upon this seminal work, explaining how the securitized-banking system, the nexus of financial markets and instruments unknown to most people, stands at the heart of the financial crisis. Gorton shows that the Panic of 2007 was not so different from the Panics of 1907 or of 1893, except that, in 2007, most people had never heard of the markets that were involved, didn't know how they worked, or what their purposes were. Terms like s...
Introduction : the new economics of debt and financial fragility /Moritz Schularik --Part 1. Finance unbound : the rise of finance and the economy.How to think about finance /Atif Mian ; comment by Karen Dynan --Reconsidering the costs and benefits of debt booms for the economy /Emil Verner ; comment by Holger Mueller --Part 2. Risk-taking : incentives, investors, institutions.Are bank CEO's to blame? /Rüdiger Fahlenbrach ; comment by Sameul G. Hanson --A new narrative of investors, subprime lending, and the 2008 crisis /Stefania Albanesi ; comment by Fernando Ferreira --Bank capital before and after financial crises /Òscar Jordà, Björn Richter, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor ; co...
A century of expanding government has distorted financial markets, stoked massive inequality, and soaked America in debt. Capitalism didn’t fail, it was ruined... What went wrong with capitalism? Ruchir Sharma’s account is not like any you will have heard before. He says progressives are right, in part, when they mock modern capitalism as “socialism for the rich.” For a century, governments have expanded in just about every measurable dimension, from spending to regulation and the scale of financial rescues when the economy wobbles. The result is expensive state guarantees for everyone—bailouts for the rich, entitlements for the middle class, welfare for the poor. Taking you back t...
During the COVID-19 pandemic and global financial crisis, governments swiftly served as financiers of last resort through large financial support measures (FSMs) such as loan and guarantee programs and equity injections in firms. This Staff Discussion Note argues that such FSMs prevented bankruptcies and attenuated the recession by increasing firms’ liquidity, reducing risk premiums, and boosting confidence. But FSMs also carry large and long-lasting fiscal costs and risks. The note presents recommendations for managing the legacies of the COVID-19 programs and preparing for future crises. Ideally, FSMs should be assessed and included in budget plans, though a balance needs to be struck between speed and scrutiny.
This is the first of a two-volume series that examines the current EU capital markets regimes and explores codification as a means for achieving a true single market for capital in Europe.
This paper relies on administrative data to study determinants and implications of US banks’ Information Technology (IT) investments, which have increased six-fold over two decades. Large and small banks had similar IT expenses a decade ago. Since then, large banks sharply increased their spending, especially those which were more exposed to competition from fintech lenders. Other local-level and bank-level factors, such as county income and bank income sources, also contribute to explain the heterogeneity in IT investments. Analysis of the mortgage market reveals that fintechs’ lending behavior is more similar to that of non-bank financial intermediaries rather than IT-savvy banks, suggesting that factors other than technology are responsible for the differences between banks and other lenders. However, both IT-savvy banks and fintech lend to lower income borrowers, pointing towards benefits for financial inclusion from higher IT adoption. Banks’ IT investments are also shown to matter for the responsiveness of bank lending to monetary policy.
Political boundaries are often porous to finance, financial intermediation, and financial distress. Yet they are highly impervious to financial regulation. When inhabitants of a country suffering a deficit of purchasing power are able to access and deploy funds flowing in from a country with a surfeit of such power, the inhabitants of both countries may benefit. They may also benefit when institutions undertaking such cross-border financial intermediation experience economies of scale and are able to innovate and to offer funds and services at lower costs. Inevitably, however, at least some such institutions will sometimes act imprudently, some of the projects in which such funds are deploye...