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Everything, More Or Less
Almost no systematic theorizing is generality-free. Scientists test general hypotheses; set theorists prove theorems about every set; metaphysicians espouse theses about all things regardless of their kind. But how general can we be and do we ever succeed in theorizing about absolutely everything? Not according to generality relativism. In its most promising form, this kind of relativism maintains that what 'everything' and other quantifiers encompass is always open to expansion: no matter how broadly we may generalize, a more inclusive 'everything' is always available. The importance of the issue comes out, in part, in relation to the foundations of mathematics. Generality relativism opens ...
The English Reports: Common Pleas
V. 1-11. House of Lords (1677-1865) -- v. 12-20. Privy Council (including Indian Appeals) (1809-1865) -- v. 21-47. Chancery (including Collateral reports) (1557-1865) -- v. 48-55. Rolls Court (1829-1865) -- v. 56-71. Vice-Chancellors' Courts (1815-1865) -- v. 72-122. King's Bench (1378-1865) -- v. 123-144. Common Pleas (1486-1865) -- v. 145-160. Exchequer (1220-1865) -- v. 161-167. Ecclesiastical (1752-1857), Admiralty (1776-1840), and Probate and Divorce (1858-1865) -- v. 168-169. Crown Cases (1743-1865) -- v. 170-176. Nisi Prius (1688-1867).
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The Foundations of Modality
The notions of necessity and possibility, as well as the notion of a possible world, are ubiquitous in philosophy. Nevertheless, these notions remain controversial. It also remains controversial whether metaphysics requires notions drawing distinctions which are finer than those which can be drawn in terms of necessity and possibility, such as the recently much-discussed notion of grounding. In order to make progress on these debates, this book develops a general framework for theorizing about such intensional notions using the tools of higher-order logic. The Foundations of Modality begins by motivating the use of higher-order logic, and introduces a particularly simple form of higher-order...
Philosophy of Mathematics
A sophisticated, original introduction to the philosophy of mathematics from one of its leading thinkers Mathematics is a model of precision and objectivity, but it appears distinct from the empirical sciences because it seems to deliver nonexperiential knowledge of a nonphysical reality of numbers, sets, and functions. How can these two aspects of mathematics be reconciled? This concise book provides a systematic, accessible introduction to the field that is trying to answer that question: the philosophy of mathematics. Øystein Linnebo, one of the world's leading scholars on the subject, introduces all of the classical approaches to the field as well as more specialized issues, including mathematical intuition, potential infinity, and the search for new mathematical axioms. Sophisticated but clear and approachable, this is an essential book for all students and teachers of philosophy and of mathematics.
Axiomatic Theories of Truth
At the centre of the traditional discussion of truth is the question of how truth is defined. Recent research, especially with the development of deflationist accounts of truth, has tended to take truth as an undefined primitive notion governed by axioms, while the liar paradox and cognate paradoxes pose problems for certain seemingly natural axioms for truth. In this book, Volker Halbach examines the most important axiomatizations of truth, explores their properties and shows how the logical results impinge on the philosophical topics related to truth. In particular, he shows that the discussion on topics such as deflationism about truth depends on the solution of the paradoxes. His book is an invaluable survey of the logical background to the philosophical discussion of truth, and will be indispensable reading for any graduate or professional philosopher in theories of truth.
