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Rational Interaction
The unifying theme of the 23 contributions to this book is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John C. Harsanyi on game theory, social choice, and the philosophy of science finds an echo in these essays. Contributions by well known game theorists and economists present a great variety of stimulating theoretical investigations. Part I contains six papers on non-cooperative game theory written by Maschler, Owen, Myerson, Peleg, Rosenmüller, Hart and Mas-Collel. Part II with three contributions by Kalei, Samet, van Damme, d'Aspremont, and Gérard-Varet is devoted to the use of non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of problems of mechanism design. Basic questions o...
Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi a...
Papers in Game Theory
This volume contains twelve of my game-theoretical papers, published in the period of 1956-80. It complements my Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation, Reidel, 1976, and my Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge University Press, 1977. These twelve papers deal with a wide range of game-theoretical problems. But there is a common intellectual thread going though all of them: they are all parts of an attempt to generalize and combine various game-theoretical solution concepts into a unified solution theory yielding one-point solutions for both cooperative and noncooperative games, and covering even such 'non-classical' gam...
Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explanation
When John Harsanyi came to Stanford University as a candidate for the Ph.D., I asked him why he was bothering, since it was most un likely that he had anything to learn from us. He was already a known scho lar; in addition to some papers in economics, the first two papers in this vol ume had already been published and had dazzled me by their originality and their combination of philosophical insight and technical competence. However, I am very glad I did not discourage him; whether he learned any thing worthwhile I don't know, but we all learned much from him on the foundations of the theory of games and specifically on the outcome of bar gaining. The central focus of Harsanyi's work has con...
Utilitarianism and Beyond
Utilitarianism considered both as a theory of personal morality and a theory of public choice.
Game Theory, Experience, Rationality
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right t...
Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences
The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know weIl, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scie...
Classics in Game Theory
Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic ...
A Celebration of John F. Nash Jr.
This collection celebrates the pathbreaking work in game theory and mathematics of John F. Nash Jr., winner of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics. Nash's analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games has had a major impact on modern economic theory. This book, also published as volume 81 of the Duke Mathematical Journal, includes an important, but previously unpublished paper by Nash; the proceedings of the Nobel seminar held in Stockholm on December 8, 1994 in his honor; and papers by distinguished mathematicians and economists written in response to and in honor of Nash's pioneering contributions to those fields. In 1950, when he was 22 years old, Nash presented his key idea...
