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Disjunctivism
Does perception provide us with direct and unmediated access to the world around us? The so-called 'argument from illusion ' has traditionally been supposed to show otherwise: from the subject's point of view, perceptual illusions are often indistinguishable from veridical perceptions; hence, perceptual experience, as such, cannot provide us with knowledge of the world, but only with knowledge of how things appear to us. Disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, first proposed by John McDowell and Paul Snowdon in the early 1980s and at the centre of current debates in the philosophy of perception, have been proposed to block this argument. According to the traditional view, a case of pe...
Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously criticizes traditional metaphysics and its proofs of immortality, free will and God's existence. What is often overlooked is that Kant also explains why rational beings must ask metaphysical questions about 'unconditioned' objects such as souls, uncaused causes or God, and why answers to these questions will appear rationally compelling to them. In this book, Marcus Willaschek reconstructs and defends Kant's account of the rational sources of metaphysics. After carefully explaining Kant's conceptions of reason and metaphysics, he offers detailed interpretations of the relevant passages from the Critique of Pure Reason (in particular, the 'Transcendental Dialectic') in which Kant explains why reason seeks 'the unconditioned'. Willaschek offers a novel interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic, pointing up its 'positive' side, while at the same time it uncovers a highly original account of metaphysical thinking that will be relevant to contemporary philosophical debates.
Defeasibility in Philosophy
Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology (Mikael Janvid, Klemens Kappel, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek, Michael Williams), legal philosophy (Frederick Schauer) and ethics and the philosophy of action (Claudia Blöser, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Quante and Katarzyna Paprzycka). The volume ends with an extensive bibliography (by Michael de Araujo Kurth).
Martha C. Nussbaum
The philosophical writings of Martha C. Nussbaum, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, are distinguished by their synthesis of different research areas and by their treatment of current, socially controversial issues. In her ethical and political philosophy, Nussbaum gives detailed readings of works from ancient Greece and Rome, interpreting classical texts with a view to their relevance for contemporary questions. Her "capabilities-approach", developed through her work on Aristotle, has become an established part of political philosophy and of the ethics of the good life. Spurred by her involvement with international organizations, Nussbaum has also employed her philosophical program to confront and investigate ways of solving problems of social justice. In this volume, Nussbaum's work is examined in the context of current philosophical debates, with discussions other thinking on the relationship of literature and ethics, on feminism, on the politics of international development, and on the idea of cosmopolitanism.
Taking Evil Seriously
While moral philosophy has traditionally been understood as an examination of the good life, this book argues that ethical inquiry should, rather, begin from an examination of evil and other 'negative' moral concepts, such as guilt and suffering.
Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason'
The Critique of Practical Reason is the second of Kant's three Critiques, and his second work in moral theory after the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Its systematic account of the authority of moral principles grounded in human autonomy unfolds Kant's considered views on morality and provides the keystone to his philosophical system. The essays in this volume shed light on the principal arguments of the second Critique and explore their relation to Kant's critical philosophy as a whole. They examine the genesis of the Critique, Kant's approach to the authority of the moral law given as a 'fact of reason', the metaphysics of free agency, the account of respect for morality as the moral motive, and questions raised by the 'primacy of practical reason' and the idea of the 'postulates'. Engaging and critical, this volume will be invaluable to advanced students and scholars of Kant and to moral theorists alike.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics
In two often neglected passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant submits that the Critique is a 'treatise' or a 'doctrine of method'. These passages are puzzling because the Critique is only cursorily concerned with identifying adequate procedures of argument for philosophy. In this book, Gabriele Gava argues that these passages point out that the Critique is the doctrine of method of metaphysics. Doctrines of method have the task of showing that a given science is indeed a science because it possesses 'architectonic unity' – which happens when it realizes the 'idea' of a science. According to Gava's novel approach, the Critique establishes that metaphysics is capable of this unity, and his reading of the Critique from this perspective not only illuminates the central role of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method within it, but also clarifies the relationship between the different parts of the work.
Kant's Metaphysics of Morals
Immanuel Kant's Metaphysics of Morals (1797), containing the Doctrine of Right and Doctrine of Virtue, is his final major work of practical philosophy. Its focus is not rational beings in general but human beings in particular, and it presupposes and deepens Kant's earlier accounts of morality, freedom and moral psychology. In this volume of newly-commissioned essays, a distinguished team of contributors explores the Metaphysics of Morals in relation to Kant's earlier works, as well as examining themes which emerge from the text itself. Topics include the relation between right and virtue, property, punishment, and moral feeling. Their diversity of questions, perspectives and approaches will provide new insights into the work for scholars in Kant's moral and political theory.
Kant's Struggle for Autonomy
Raef Zreik traces Kant's struggle to establish the concept of "autonomy" as an organizing principle in his practical philosophy. While describing the inherent tensions facing this project, this book offers a fresh way of understanding contemporary debates.
Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- A Note on Abbreviations and References -- Preface -- Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment: An Introduction -- 1 Hutcheson on the Unity of Virtue and Right -- 2 Hutcheson and Kant: Moral Sense and Moral Feeling -- 3 Hutcheson's and Kant's Critique of Sympathy -- 4 Kant and Hutcheson on Aesthetics and Teleology -- 5 Outer Sense, Inner Sense, and Feeling: Hutcheson and Kant on Aesthetic Pleasure -- 6 Taste, Morality, and Common Sense: Kant and the Scots -- 7 Kant and Hume on Feelings in Moral Philosophy -- 8 Hume's Principle and Kant's Pure Rational System of Religion: Grace, Providence, and the Highest Good -- 9 A Writer More Excellent th...
