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Banking Stability Measures
This paper defines a set of banking stability measures which take account of distress dependence among the banks in a system, thereby providing a set of tools to analyze stability from complementary perspectives by allowing the measurement of (i) common distress of the banks in a system, (ii) distress between specific banks, and (iii) distress in the system associated with a specific bank. Our approach defines the banking system as a portfolio of banks and infers the system's multivariate density (BSMD) from which the proposed measures are estimated. The BSMD embeds the banks' default inter-dependence structure that captures linear and non-linear distress dependencies among the banks in the system, and its changes at different times of the economic cycle. The BSMD is recovered using the CIMDO-approach, a new approach that in the presence of restricted data, improves density specification without explicitly imposing parametric forms that, under restricted data sets, are difficult to model. Thus, the proposed measures can be constructed from a very limited set of publicly available data and can be provided for a wide range of both developing and developed countries.
Optimal Bank Recovery
Banks’ living wills involve both recovery and resolution. Since it may not always be clear when recovery plans or actions should be triggered, there is a role for an objective metric to trigger recovery. We outline how such a metric could be constructed meeting criteria of (i) adequate loss absorption; (ii) distinguishing between weak and sound banks; (iii) little susceptibility to manipulation; (iv) timeliness; (v) scalable from the individual bank to the system. We show how this would have worked in the U.K., during 2007–11. This approach has the added advantage that it could be extended to encompass a whole ladder of sanctions of increasing severity as capital erodes.
Sovereign Spreads
Over the past year, euro area sovereign spreads have exhibited an unprecedented degree of volatility. This paper explores how much of these large movements reflected shifts in (i) global risk aversion (ii) country-specific risks, directly from worsening fundamentals, or indirectly from spillovers originating in other sovereigns. The analysis shows that earlier in the crisis, the surge in global risk aversion was a significant factor influencing sovereign spreads, while recently country-specific factors have started playing a more important role. The perceived source of contagion itself has changed: previously, it could be found among those sovereigns hit hard by the financial crisis, such as Austria, the Netherlands, and Ireland, whereas lately the countries putting pressure on euro area government bonds have been primarily Greece, Portugal, and Spain, as the emphasis has shifted towards short-term refinancing risk and long-term fiscal sustainability. The paper concludes that debt sustainability and appropriate management of sovereign balance sheets are necessary conditions for preventing sovereign risk from feeding back into broader financial stability concerns.
Macroprudential Stress Tests and Policies: Searching for Robust and Implementable Frameworks
Macroprudential stress testing (MaPST) is becoming firmly embedded in the post-crisis policy-frameworks of financial-sectors around the world. MaPSTs can offer quantitative, forward-looking assessments of the resilience of financial systems as a whole, to particularly adverse shocks. Therefore, they are well suited to support the surveillance of macrofinancial vulnerabilities and to inform the use of macroprudential policy-instruments. This report summarizes the findings of a joint-research effort by MCM and the Systemic-Risk-Centre, which aimed at (i) presenting state-of-the-art approaches on MaPST, including modeling and implementation-challenges; (ii) providing a roadmap for future-research, and; (iii) discussing the potential uses of MaPST to support policy.
Macroprudential Stress Tests: A Reduced-Form Approach to Quantifying Systemic Risk Losses
We present a novel approach that incorporates individual entity stress testing and losses from systemic risk effects (SE losses) into macroprudential stress testing. SE losses are measured using a reduced-form model to value financial entity assets, conditional on macroeconomic stress and the distress of other entities in the system. This valuation is made possible by a multivariate density which characterizes the asset values of the financial entities making up the system. In this paper this density is estimated using CIMDO, a statistical approach, which infers densities that are consistent with entities’ probabilities of default, which in this case are estimated using market-based data. Hence, SE losses capture the effects of interconnectedness structures that are consistent with markets’ perceptions of risk. We then show how SE losses can be decomposed into the likelihood of distress and the magnitude of losses, thereby quantifying the contribution of specific entities to systemic contagion. To illustrate the approach, we quantify SE losses due to Lehman Brothers’ default.
Securitization
The discussion in this note seeks to preserve the beneficial features of securitization while mitigating those that may pose risks to financial stability. A comprehensive set of reforms—targeting both supply- and demand-side inefficiencies—will be needed to put securitization back on a sound, growth-supportive footing. The note departs from others in proposing a broad suite of principles applicable to various elements of the financial intermediation chain. After indentifying where policy makers have already made progress, we then propose measures to address remaining impediments to the rehabilitation of securitization markets. We also encourage more consistent industry standards for the classification of risk (albeit applied at a granular rather than overarching level). Finally, we introduce various initiatives that could aid in fostering the development of a diversified non-bank investor base for securitization in Europe.
IMF Working Papers
None
A Comprehensive Multi-Sector Tool for Analysis of Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness (SyRIN)
This paper presents the Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness (SyRIN) tool. SyRIN allows a comprehensive assessment of systemic risk via quantification of the impact of risk amplification mechanisms, due to interconnectedness structures across banks and other financial intermediaries—insurance, pension fund, hedge fund and investment fund sectors, which cannot be captured when analyzing sectors independently. The tool produces various metrics to evaluate systemic risk from complementary perspectives, including tail risk, cross-entity interconnectedness and the contribution to systemic risk by different entities and sectors. SyRIN is easily implementable with publicly available data and can be adapted to cater to different degrees of institutional granularity and data availability. The framework is designed to be a tool to identify vulnerabilities from a top-down perspective that can lead to deeper analysis in specific sectors for policy formulation.
Default, Credit Growth, and Asset Prices
This paper uses a Merton-type estimate of the probability of default (PoD) for the main banks in a sample of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and middle-income countries as a proxy for the fragility of their banking systems. Based on theory and stylized facts, the paper explores a range of financial and real variables that explain such PoDs across time. We find property price fluctuations and bank credit to be important explanatory factors. There is two-way interaction between these variables and a clearer relationship when the variables are entered as a deviation from trend. The lag structure between such developments and PoDs is long and varies widely across countries. The paper assesses the implications of these findings for economic policy.
Securitization
This paper examines the financial stability implications arising from securitization markets, with one eye on the past and another on the future. The paper begins by deriving a number of “lessons learned” based on an examination of key industry developments in the years before the crisis. Emphasis is placed on the various ways in which securitization markets dramatically changed shape in the years preceding the crisis, vis-à-vis their earlier (simpler) incarnation. Current impediments to securitization markets are then discussed, including a treatment of various regulatory initiatives, the operational infrastructure of securitization markets, and related official sector intervention. Finally, a broad suite of policy recommendations is presented to address the factors that either contributed to the crisis or may currently be posing obstacles to growth-supportive, sustainable securitization markets. These proposals are guided by the objective of preserving the beneficial features of securitization, while mitigating those that pose a potential risk to financial stability.
